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Problem statement
This thesis aims to model and analyze the Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Cer-
tificate Market. A stochastic model based on dynamic programming is imple-
mented to asses the performance of this market and to forecast certificate prices.
By looking into the implications of regulatory changes to the market structure,
this work aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the design of energy
policies.

Preface
One of the greatest challenges of our time are the threats posed to earth’s ecosys-
tems by human activity. Over the last 50 years the world population has nearly
tripled, increasing from 2.5 to nearly 6.5 billion. During this period we have seen
the greatest loss of biodiversity in human history while the atmospheric carbon
dioxide consentration has increased to levels not seen on earth for 600,000 years.
Scientists relate these levels to an increase in the global temperature levels and
to more intense weather conditions. This change in atmospheric composition is
caused mainly by the burning of fossil fuels.
In order to address these issues, a variety of environmental policies have been
proposed. Traditional environmental policies have usually involved providing
subsidies, or imposing obligations on market actors. However, over the last
decades, several countries have introduced market-based support schemes fa-
voring investments in renewable energy. Tradable Green Certificate (TGC)
markets is an example of such a market-based energy policy which incentivize
investments in renewable energy.
For this Master’s thesis, we implement a proposed a model for such a market,
and discuss the e↵ects of expectations and uncertainty on the performance of
these support schemes. The purpose is to give a contribution to the ongoing
debate on the design of environmental policies. Hopefully the thesis can lead to
a better understanding of the mechanisms in these markets and ultimately to
an increase in the deployment of renewable capacity.
We would like to acknowledge and extend our heartfelt gratitude to the fol-
lowing persons who have made the completion of this Master’s thesis possible:
Our supervisor, Professor Stein Erik Fleten, for his vital encouragement and
support throughout the project. We also wish to thank Ove Wolfgang for useful
guidance and insightful questions during the process. Finally, we would like to
thank our families, who have supported us every step of the way.
Trondheim, June 11 2015
Jens Sveen Frogner Magne Hustveit

Abstract
This thesis explores tradable green certificate markets, a support scheme for
investments in renewable electricity production. A case-study on the Swedish-
Norwegian Electricity Certificate market is conducted. In this market producers
investing in new renewable capacity receive certificates based on their actual
production. These are sold to retailers of electricity, which are required to buy
certificates for a proportion of their total sales. The design and potential suc-
cess of this multistate support mechanism is of great interest to policy makers
and green investors. A stochastic model based on dynamic programming is im-
plemented to assess the performance of this market. A discussion on market
dynamics, uncertainty and expectations forms the basis for the model choices.
The main findings from the model include i) Price expectations are not formed
easily, and hence, investment decisions have to be made under a lot of uncer-
tainty, ii) Under the current market structure, prices are expected to start at
today’s level, while decreasing steadily towards zero in 2035 when the market
is planned to end, iii) The prices are highly sensitive to changes in electricity
consumption and generation of electricity, iv) Regulatory changes should be im-
plemented carefully to avoid increased uncertainty and a consequent increase in
price volatility and v) The price-based penalty further increases the volatility
of the market. So far, the market has shown its ability to promote investments
in renewable electricity production, however improvements of the market seem
beneficial.
Summary in Norwegian
Denne masteroppgaven utforsker markeder for grønne sertifikater. Dette er
markeder konstruert av myndigheter eller andre regulatorer for a˚ fremme in-
vesteringer i fornybare energikilder. En studie av det svensk-norske elsertifikat-
markedet har blitt gjennomført. I dette markedet vil kraftprodusenter som
investerer i ny fornybar kapasitet bli tildelt sertifikater basert p˚a denne kapa-
sitetens ma˚nedlige produksjon av strøm. Sertifikatene kan videre bli solgt til
strømforhandlere. Disse er p˚alagt a˚ kjøpe et antall sertifikater basert p˚a sitt
a˚rlige salg av strøm. Utformingen og e↵ektene av markedet for grønne serti-
fikater bør være av betydelig interesse for myndigheter og selskaper som vurderer
investeringer i fornybar energi. En stokastisk modell, basert p˚a dynamisk pro-
grammering, blir benyttet i analysene. En diskusjon om dynamikk, usikkerhet
og forventninger danner grunnlaget for modelleringen. Hovedfunnene fra anal-
ysen inkluderer i) Det er utfordrende a˚ danne rasjonelle forventninger til prisen
p˚a sertifikater, og investeringer blir dermed gjort under betydelig usikkerhet,
ii) Gitt dagens markedsstruktur gir modellen priser som starter p˚a dagens niv˚a,
men som synker jevnt mot null ettersom markedet nærmer seg sin planlagte slutt
i 2035, iii) Prisene er veldig sensitive til variasjoner i konsum og produksjon av
strøm, iv) Endringer i markedsstruktur bør innføres med forsiktighet for a˚ hin-
dre økt usikkerhet, og følgende økt prisvolatilitet og v) Den prisbaserte stra↵en
fører til ytterligere volatilitet i markedet. Hittil har markedet vist at det evner a˚
fremme investeringer i fornybar energi, men forbedringer virker hensiktsmessig.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Over the past years, an increased focus on emission reductions has led to the
development of a variety of energy policies penalizing emissive and promoting
clean industries. The tradable green certificate (TGC) market addressed in
this paper is an example of a market-based policy promoting electricity from
renewable energy sources. Lately, there has been considerable interest in such
markets, as several countries have launched these in attempts to implement
more cost-e↵ective alternatives to the traditionally used Feed-In-Tari↵ regimes.
The main research question addressed in this thesis is:
How will the Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market perform under
the current regulation, and how will it react to changes in regulation?
A series of sub-questions follow:
1. How are expectations of prices and penalties formed, and what are the
rationales behind an investment decision?
2. What is the e↵ects of uncertainty?
3. How can the regulations be changed to improve the performance of the
market?
The main contribution of this Master’s thesis is the article, ”A Dynamic
Model of the Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Market” [1]. It proposes a stochas-
tic dynamic programming approach to modelling the Swedish-Norwegian elec-
tricity certificate market by extending the work of Coulon et al. [2]. This type
of model has not been explored for this market before. A review of relevant
literature and a discussion on market dynamics, uncertainty and expectations
forms the basis for the model choices. Running the model for di↵erent scenarios,
it is shown that the model captures the market dynamics well. Policy changes
suggested by regulators’ for the upcoming market progress review are analyzed
and discussed. Additionally, several alternatives for the investment decision ra-
tionale, as well as di↵erent mechanisms for forming penalty fee expectations, is
explored. The article has been prepared for submission to a scientific journal.
The second article ”Renewable portfolio standards, Tradable green certifi-
cates, Energy policy, Dynamic equilibrium, Market analysis” [3], were the au-
thors’ contribution to the EEM15 conference. The conference was held in Lis-
bon, where the article content was presented. The article provides a brief in-
troduction to the Swedish-Norwegian electricity certificate market along with a
case study adapting the model by Coulon et al. [2] to this market. The article
will be published in the IEEE Xplore database.
This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics in
a TGC market. The model of Coulon et al. is extended by adding the penalty
fee as a state variable and including relationships between investments, the
electricity market and the Levelized Cost of Energy, (LCOE). Further, it in-
corporates all the important features in a TGC market, such as the investment
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rate, the requirement level, the penalty level and a stochastic production of eli-
gible electricity. By providing a better understanding of the formation of price
expectations, the investment rationale and the role of uncertainty, the paper
contributes to the debate on design of energy policies and to improvements in
market e ciency. The proposed model can also be a supplemental tool for mar-
ket actors and regulators.
Additional chapters, have been added to the thesis to provide the reader with
background information not included in the main articles. The second chapter
gives an introduction to the features of market-based energy policies, and dis-
cusses these in relation to more traditional subsidy and tax policies. Chapter
3 presents di↵erent methods for modeling such markets, while the final chapter
discusses the modeling choices.
2 Market-Based Environmental Policies
Harnessing the power of market forces in the design of environmental policies is
not a new idea. For a properly designed and implemented market-based policy,
environmental-friendly behavior is encouraged through price signals rather than
explicit taxes or subsidies. Tradable green certificate (TGC) markets and emis-
sion trading systems (ETS) are examples of such market-based policies used
as alternatives to traditional renewable energy subsidies, often called Feed-In-
Tari↵s (FIT), and carbon taxes. TGC markets puts a lower bound on the
quantity of electricity that must come from renewable sources. Emission trad-
ing systems puts an upper bound on the quantity of allowed emissions. The
market then decides the price on renewable sources and emissions. These sys-
tems are often called cap and trade markets, as the government decides the
quantity, while the price is determined in the market.
Though such market mechanisms have been in place for several years, their
success has varied, and there is still ongoing debate on whether these policies
yields the desired e↵ects. Several papers have assessed the performance of TGC
markets compared to FIT regimes. In theory, a TGC market would stimulate
investments in renewable energy capacity at the lowest possible social cost, as
the market prices the additional renewable electricity capacity correctly. Sev-
eral European countries have however implemented successful FIT regimes at a
modest social cost. Haas et al. [4] finds that TGC systems show to be less e↵ec-
tive with respect to deployment of less mature renewable energy technologies.
The intrinsic stability of FIT systems appears to be a key element in the suc-
cess of these policies. According to Haas et al., a well-designed (dynamic) FIT
system will provide a certain deployment of renewable electricity in a shorter
time and at the lowest social cost. Midttun & Gautesen [5] argue that FIT
regimes and TGC markets should be seen as complementary regulatory instru-
ments targeting subsequent steps in the product cycle, on the way from early
technology-conceptualisation and development towards competitive positioning
in mature energy markets. Bergek and Jacobsson [6] find supporting arguments
from an empirical study on the Swedish TGC market. They conclude that the
TGC system reaches its target at a low cost for society, but at a higher cost for
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consumers than necessary and with little incentive for technology development.
As of this moment it does not seem like any of the two policies have emerged as
the better alternative. In theory, a TGC policy has a lower social cost, while a
FIT regime provides less uncertainty to investors and provides stronger incen-
tives for technology change.
A TGC market can be implemented both for a single country, and as a
harmonized policy spanning a region of countries. In the report ”European
RES-E Policy Analysis”[7] it is found that a EU-wide harmonized TGC market
will lower the total costs of meeting the EU renewable target. Morthorst [8]
argues that an international TGC market is not recommended if the TGC-
market is implemented with the goal of achieving the national CO2-reduction
targets. Even the most ambitious countries with regards to increasing their
TGC-quotas will only partly be gaining the CO2-reduction benefits themselves,
as the additional capacity may be built in other countries. Only when a green
certificate market is combined with a tradable permit scheme, the trade in
certificates is equivalent to the domestic development of renewables [9]. On the
other hand, del Rio [10] argues that if the policy priority is an increased share of
RES-E, the minimum costs harmonization should be favored by national energy
authorities. Then the total social costs are reduced, as the most profitable
investments are taken independent of borders.
3 Methods for Modeling an Electricity Certifi-
cate Market
Several organizations are currently working on models for the Swedish-Norwegian
market for electricity certificates. Best practices for modeling the market has
not yet been established, as can be seen from the several di↵erent approaches
that are being taken. This chapter aims to give an overview of the various
methods and a brief introduction to some of the existing models. Methods for
modeling a certificate market can be separated into two types, analytical and
numerical. The analytical models can provide a basic understanding of the mar-
ket and some simple relations and results. An example of an analytical model is
described in the paper of Amundsen and Mortensen, on the e↵ects from Green
Certificates and CO2-emission permits for the Danish market [11]. The model
is used to investigate the e↵ects of several factors believed to impact the power
grid and its actors. They find that more rigorous CO2 constraints, as well as an
increased price for import wholesale electricity, may lead to a reduced capacity
for renewable energy production. Further, they are not able to conclude on
whether an increase in certificate requirements leads to a change in the capacity
of renewable energy, but they find that a higher share of consumption will stem
from renewables, as the total electricity consumption is reduced. Another exam-
ple is the analytical model described in the paper of Morthorst from 2003 where
he concludes that the long term certificate price is formed such that the sum
of the electricity spot price and the certificate price should equal the long run
marginal cost of investing in new renewable capacity [8]. Generally, analytical
models can be a good starting point before providing more advanced models.
From this point on, this text will focus on numerical models, enabling detailed
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simulations of the market and its behavior. Numerical models can be divided
into four main categories, discussed in the subsequent sections.
3.1 Fundamental Equilibrium
Fundamental equilibrium models formulate the market equilibrium models as
large optimization problems, minimizing or maximizing an objective function
subject to a set of constraints.1 Estimates for future prices are then obtained by
solving the model for market equilibrium. Such models require perfect competi-
tion and rational behavior from all players in the market. Modeling supply and
demand curves as step-functions yields LP-problems; this subsequently helps
lowering complexity and hence lowers the runtime. Equilibrium models can
both be static, considering only one time period, and dynamic, with relations
between several time periods e.g. inventory equations for storage of certificates
and energy over time.
A fundamental equilibrium model can be found in the paper of Unger and
Ahlgren from 2005. They apply the Markal model-generator [12] for the energy
systems of Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. They maximize the objec-
tive function, chosen to be the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Among
their findings is that the introduction of TGC quotas reduces wholesale elec-
tricity prices, while retail prices can be higher or lower depending on the TGC
quota [13].
Another example of a fundamental partial equilibrium model is the recently
developed model by Wolfgang & Jaehnert of the Swedish-Norwegian Electricity
Certificate market [14]. The model is an extension of the EMPS model, a partial
model for electricity markets, used by producers, regulators and system opera-
tors throughout Scandinavia. The extension introduces electricity certificates to
this model. A price of certificates is calculated through stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming with weekly time resolution for the remainder of the system lifetime
and endogenously determined penalty rates. The strategy calculations are done
for several fixed penalty rates. This is done to avoid introducing another state
variable in this part of the solution algorithm, for the sake of computational
tractability. Further, the expected penalty rate is calculated as an endogenous
variable in the formal LP part of the model. The value obtained for the penalty
rate is then used to choose the correct strategy, by interpolating between the
fixed penalty rates used in the strategy calculation. This seems to be a well-
functioning method. By using results from the EMPS model, the dependency
between the electricity market and investments in additional capacity and pro-
duction levels are directly included. They find the results to be consistent with
other studies on similar TGC markets, i.e. in particular that “price-scenarios
spread out such that the unconditional expected price of certificates is relatively
stable in the planning period.” [14]
1An example of such optimization problems could be to minimize the total system costs
subject to an inventory constraint and a requirement constraint.
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3.2 Agent Based Models
Agent based models aim to simulate the behavior and interaction between play-
ers in a system. Every individual agent is acting according to their observed
situation based on a set of specified rules. Making these agents act realistically
requires detailed information regarding behavioral pattern of each player type.
This information is typically gathered by interviewing actual market actors.
Once the agents are programmed, the market can be simulated. The simulation
continues until it reaches a steady state. Such models allow for analysis of inter-
action between market actors. From the steady state situation, an equilibrium
price can be obtained. Unlike the fundamental models, where rational behavior
and perfect competition is assumed, this approach allows for the introduction of
irrational behavior. Another positive feature is the possibility of implementing
a form of learning process into the agents. Agents that performed well in the
first period would want to act similar in the next, while agents that did poorly
would try to adjust their behavior, hoping to improve their performance. The
core strengths of these models include the ability to handle market power and
imperfections more easily. A disadvantage of such an approach is that tracking
the dependency between causes and e↵ects could prove di cult.
An example of an agent based model can be found in the paper of Aune et
al. from 2012 [15]. They analyze the potential for cost reductions by allowing
for trade in green certificates across member states. Their findings indicate that
EU-wide trade in green certificates may cut the EU’s total cost of fulfilling the
renewable target by as much as 70 percent compared to a situation with no
trade.2
3.3 Statistical Approaches
Statistical models are purely based on historical price data. They assume that
what will happen in the future is reflected in history. From these historical
data, parameters can be obtained to calibrate a parametric model. Exogenous
variables can still be added to explain expected future changes. These systems
has to be static, i.e. there are no dynamic relations between current and future
model parameters.
An example of a statistical model can be found in the paper of Fagiani and
Hakvoort from 2014 [16]. They use a GARCH model to analyze the causes of
volatility and the e↵ects of volatility on certificate prices. From their results it
can be seen that regulatory changes strongly a↵ect certificate markets, resulting
in periods of higher volatility. During such periods of higher volatility, investors
will require a higher rate of return. More specifically, they analyze whether
certificate price volatility has changed after the creation of a joint Swedish-
Norwegian electricity certificate market. Results indicate that the news about
this extended market led to a period of increased price volatility between 2010
2An agent based model for the Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate market has re-
cently been developed. The project was led by the Norwegian companies Optimeering and
Thema Consulting and was financed by the Norwegian Research Council. They have inter-
viewed several market players, and are modeling the di↵erent types of players’ behavior to be
able to predict prices and identify potential market improvements.
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and 2011. They also note that this e↵ect is not fully reversed, and that the
market is still more volatile than before the change. This e↵ect may be re-
versed as the market matures and quotas increase. However, a question raised
by Fagiani and Hakvoort, is whether a larger market provides more stable prices.
3.4 System Dynamics
System dynamics modeling is an approach to understanding the behavior of
complex systems over time. Such models are comprised of a coupled set of non-
linear di↵erential equations, describing relations between actors, feedback loops
and time delays. Further, the set of di↵erential equations is used to simulate
the system behavior.
An example of a system dynamics model can be found in the paper by A.
Ford et al. from 2007 [17]. They simulate the price dynamics of a TGC market
designed to support an aggressive mandate for wind generation in the north-
western USA. Their results indicate that the certificate prices climb rapidly to
the penalty level in the early years of the market. This is met with increased
investments in wind generation capacity, forcing certificate prices back down.
Prices then stabilize (though smaller fluctuations still occur). The same results
are obtained for simulations with di↵erent values for the uncertain parameters,
such as price elasticity, penalty level and lead-time on investments. The results
are consistent with actual price data from the early years of the Swedish elec-
tricity certificate market, which started in 2003.
3.5 Choice of Method
The model described in the first article is a fundamental model, with some as-
pects from system dynamics. It is an extended version of the work by Coulon
et al. [2] for the SREC market in New Jersey. Our extended version is based
on dynamic programming, with balance of certificates, annual eligible electricity
production and penalty fee as state variables and with stochastic terms on the
monthly electricity price and monthly production of eligible electricity. The
model is solved for the certificate price for every combination of the state vari-
ables with a monthly time resolution by applying a backward recursion algo-
rithm. A detailed explanation of the model is found in chapter four of the
article. The main reasons for the choice of model are listed below:
1. The model by Coulon et al. showed promising results for the New Jersey
SREC market.
2. An approach based on dynamic programming has not been implemented
for Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market before.
3. A fundamental model allows for tracking of dependencies between causes
and e↵ects.
4. The dynamic programming approach allows the modeling of complex re-
lations between time-steps.
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5. The model allows for the testing of multiple scenarios.
The main di↵erences between the model described here and and the model of
Coulon et al. are the inclusion of the penalty fee as an additional state variable,
the integration of a dependency between the electricity price and the lifetime
costs on investment and the possibility of infinite banking.
4 Evaluation of choices
Model building can be considered a simplification of reality. While addressing
complex problems, identifying which are the important relationships that must
be maintained and which are the ones that can be ignored or simplified is of the
utmost importance. This discussion outlines which relationships were included
in the electricity certificate model, how they were included and which relation-
ships were left out. It serves as a supplement to the information presented in
chapter 2 of the first article.
4.1 Included Relations
The price relationship is modeled such that the certificate price should equal
the discounted value of the expected penalty times the probability of having to
pay this penalty. This relation is chosen, as it is expected to best capture the
market dynamics throughout the market lifetime. After an investment has been
made, the short-term marginal cost of certificates is approximately zero. Hence,
suppliers of certificates could some times be willing to sell at substantially lower
prices than the long-term price required by investors to make an investment de-
cision. This captures the e↵ects from shifts in the certificate supply and demand
curve. On the other hand, e↵ects caused by a changed probability for having to
pay the penalty may be under-estimated if the actors’ view on the probability
for penalty does not change accordingly, following an unexpected shift in the
supply or demand for certificates. It is noted that having one or a few of the
actors in the market acting according to the assumed relation would su ce for
the relation to hold. Further, in a scenario where the price suggested by the
relation is lower than the level required for the marginal plant to be profitable, a
possible outcome could be that no producers are willing to sell their certificates
at this lower level. This would however be an ine cient market solution, which
is not expected for liquid spot and futures markets.
The issuance relation describes the monthly eligible electricity production,
i.e. issuance of certificates, and is modeled so that there is both seasonal and an-
nual variance. This captures the fluctuating nature of generation from renewable
energy sources, especially from wind energy, resulting from changing weather
conditions. Since the annual issuance of certificates is a function of annual
certificate-eligible generation, and since the requirement imposed on retailers is
fulfilled once every year, long-term fluctuations are of special interest. Seasonal
variance is not expected to a↵ect the certificate price to any great extent. The
magnitude of the annual variance is uncertain and will depend largely on the
technology composition among certificate-eligible power plants. The variance
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assumption is based on the regression of the historical issuance of certificates,
and thus, represents the historical technology composition. This is assessed to
be adequately precise, as the technology composition is only expected to expe-
rience small changes. To obtain more precise estimates of the annual variance,
the technology composition of new investments could have been modeled en-
dogenously. This is left out in order to maintain computational tractability and
since the regression is believed to yield an adequate estimate.
The investment relation is modeled as a combination of a time-dependent
term and a term depending on the basic profit equation for a power plant, i.e.
the sum of the expected certificate and electricity price less the Levelized Cost
of Energy of the investment opportunity. The time dependent investments are
included as several power plants have already been planned and found profitable
within a reasonable price range. At the same time, some investors are still con-
sidering new investments. These are expected to delay their decision until the
certificate and electricity price is at a level that make their investment opportu-
nity profitable. This will also take the lowered price expectations resulting from
an increase in supply into account, when considering new investments. From
the regression on historical prices and issuance it is found that there is very little
or no correlation between investments and the profit equation. It is di cult to
conclude on whether this mechanism is significant. There are substantial lead-
times on new investments, which makes it hard to track the cause and e↵ect for
the investment-decision. In addition, investors may apply varying methods of
forecasting the certificate and electricity price. In spite of this, it is natural to
assume that there exists some degree of correlation, as a rational investor would
require a positive estimation of future cash flows. A potential shortcoming of
the model, could be, the implementation of wrong assumptions on the invest-
ment rationale. Further research would be needed to investigate this correlation.
The penalty equation is modeled so that the expected penalty is a function
of all known information for the given month, i.e. the expected penalty equals
1.5 times the weighted average of the current price and the monthly prices ob-
served since the last compliance date. An exception has been made for the first
month following a compliance date, where the expected penalty is the average
of 1.5 times the current price and the actual observed penalty from the previous
year. Hence, stable price expectations are assumed in the formation of penalty
fee expectations. An alternative form, where the prices over the remainder of
the year is assumed equal to the price in the current time-step is also tested.
This does not cause noticeable changes in the resulting forecasts.
The inclusion of the penalty fee as a state variable was made feasible due
to the substantial improvements in run-time, described in Appendix A. Uti-
lizing methods from approximate dynamic programming, or simulation of the
penalty fee outside the model were among the alternatives considered. The first
is di cult for the given approach, since this does not include an objective func-
tion. The latter was conducted inspired by the successful procedure described
by Wolfgang and Jaehner [14]. The procedure showed promising results. The
inclusion of an additional state variable is however considered to be the best
alternative, as long as the computational tractability of the model is preserved.
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4.2 Omitted Relations
This section discusses relations and dynamics that have been considered imple-
mented but have been left out or modeled di↵erently. Complexity and compu-
tational run-time have been essential factors in deciding whether to include, or
leave out a relation from the model. The curse of dimensionality is one of the
main challenges in dynamic programming [18]. Thus it is important to limit the
number of state variables in order to preserve computational tractability.
The magnitude of the expected annual variation in electricity production is
di↵erent for di↵erent renewable technologies. Hence, investors may have di↵er-
ent rationales for investment in hydro, bio, wind or solar PV. The model does
however, not distinguish between these di↵erent technologies. Renewables like
bio and reservoir hydro always face an option of whether to produce or not and
could have a stabilizing e↵ect on the market. Hence, di↵erentiating between
technologies could have further refined the model. This is however not expected
to have a large impact on the model output as these sources accounts for a small
share of the total market. Furthermore, the inclusion of this feature would re-
quire an extensive qualitative study among potential investors and would also
increase run-time.
The timing of investment decides when the power plant will be phased out
from the certificate market. However, for this model, the phase-out of eligible
capacity is not updated endogenously. This is done exogenously prior to each
model run. Since the investment decision is modeled endogenously, this causes a
potential mismatch between the time an investment’s capacity is phased in and
the time it is phased out. Given the backwards recursive nature of the solution
algorithm, this issue is not easily addressed, since the events are separated in
time, and since the model is solved for the time step of the phase-out before
it is solved for the time step when the investment decision is made. However,
the e↵ects of this mismatch should not be severe, as the endogenous timing of
investments does not deviate substantially from the estimates made exogenously.
All new investments cause a positive shift in the supply of electricity, which
consequently causes lower electricity prices. This e↵ect could have been mod-
eled through the inclusion of electricity price as an endogenous variable. The
electricity price is however modeled exogenously. Investors in generation ca-
pacity are believed to care most about the long term trends of the electricity
market. Further, changes in electricity prices caused by new investments are
assumed incorporated in the futures prices of electricity, which is the input
to the Schwartz-Smith model. Hence, investors’ expectations for the future of
the electricity market is modeled through the long-term equilibrium level of a
Schwartz-Smith 2-factor model.
Further, an immediate response from certificate price changes on investments
is assumed. Implicitly, this translates into an assumption of no lead-time for
investment opportunities. Including a lead-time would require the inclusion of
another additional state variable. This would increase run-time substantially.
The assumption could be justified by the Coulon et al.[2] who find the lead-time
to have modest impact on price forecasts.
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4 EVALUATION OF CHOICES
An assumption is also made about Swedish investments made after 2020.
While Norwegian investments must be made before 2020 in order to receive cer-
tificates, Swedish investments may be considered certificate-eligible after this
time. These opportunity has been left out of the market model. This assump-
tion is justified by the belief that investors will not make investments causing
over-supply, and collapse in certificate prices. Hence, new investments are not
believed to be made after 2020, given that the target of the market is met.
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Abstract
This paper explores tradable green certificate markets, a support scheme for investments in renewable electricity pro-
duction. A case-study on the Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate market is conducted. In this market producers
investing in new renewable capacity receive certificates based on their actual production. These are sold to retailers of
electricity, which are required to buy certificates for a proportion of their total sales. The design and potential success of
this multistate support mechanism is of great interest to policy makers and green investors. A stochastic model based
on dynamic programming is implemented to assess the performance of this market. A discussion on market dynamics,
uncertainty and expectations forms the basis for the model choices. The main findings from the model include i) Price
expectations are not formed easily, and hence, investment decisions have to be made under a lot of uncertainty, ii) Un-
der the current market structure, prices are expected to start at today’s level, while decreasing steadily towards zero in
2035 when the market is planned to end, iii) The prices are highly sensitive to changes in electricity consumption and
generation of electricity, iv) Regulatory changes should be implemented carefully to avoid increased uncertainty and
a consequent increase in price volatility and v) The price-based penalty further increases the volatility of the market.
So far, the market has shown its ability to promote investments in renewable electricity production, however improve-
ments of the market seem beneficial.
Keywords: Renewable portfolio standards, Tradable green certificates, Energy policy, Dynamic equilibrium,
Expectations, Uncertainty
1. Introduction
Over the last decades, several energy policies have
been developed. The tradable green certificate (TGC)
market in Sweden and Norway is an example of a
market-based energy policy, used by governments to
promote the development of increased share of elec-
tricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) in the
grid. In contrast to a pure subsidy policy, such as the
Feed-In-Tariffs (FIT) used in several European countries,
a TGC market is a quantity-based system relying on
market forces to determine the certificate price, whereas
the feed-in system is a price-based system with greater
involvement from the government. The TGC market
can be mimicked through a subsidy on green energy
production and a tax on energy consumption under the
restriction of budget neutrality [1]. Producers of renew-
able electricity receive subsidies through certificates for
their production, while consumers of electricity are taxed
through the addition of the certificate cost on the bill from
their electricity retailer. However, the introduction of
TGC quotas reduces wholesale electricity prices because
Email addresses: magnehustveit@gmail.com (Magne Hustveit),
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of an increased supply of electricity with a low short term
marginal cost. Thus, the tax is fully or partly redirected
to the producers of conventional electricity [2] [3] [4].
As has been observed historically, both TGC markets
and emission tradingmarkets are intrinsically susceptible
to unstable prices, which can potentially swing rapidly
from nearly zero to the penalty level, despite relatively
small changes in the underlying supply and demand
forces [5]. Understanding the price dynamics is of major
importance for market actors. Considering an invest-
ment, investors must form certificate price expectations.
Retailers would need to form price expectations when
considering the timing of the certificate purchases needed
to meet their obligations. Further, the regulators will
need to understand the dynamics of this price formation,
in order to design markets that function well and yield
the desired effects. Earlier works on equilibrium price
formation in similar markets for emission allowances
include the paper of Montgomery [6] showing how
cost minimization can form an equilibrium price, and
Rubin [7] who provides an analysis of the inter-temporal
effects of banking and borrowing between time-steps.
Further, Daskalakis et al. [8] find that this has significant
implications in terms of futures pricing. Carmona et al.
[9] suggest that the conditional probability for a deficit
of allowance credits times the penalty characterizes the
equilibrium price. This view is supported in e.g. [10], [11]
and [12]. In an early work on TGC markets, Morthorst
[13] suggest that the certificate price should equal the
cost of renewable generation less the electricity price.
Coulon et al. [5] and Wolgang & Jaehnert [14] describe
stochastic models for TGC markets, both making major
contributions to an improved knowledge of the market
dynamics. While both assume a price equilibrium in
accordance with the condition suggested in [9], [14]
argues that this should not be seen as contradictory to
the price equilibrium suggested in [13]. Other works an-
alyzing TGC markets include fundamental equilibrium
models [3], system dynamic approaches [15], agent-based
approaches [16] and econometric studies [17].
Addressing the uncertainty in TGC markets should be
of the utmost importance to market regulators. The value
of flexibility increases with uncertainty, thus technologies
with high variable and low fixed costs become more
attractive as uncertainty rises [18]. Kildegaard [19] finds
evidence for this shift towards the low fixed-cost alterna-
tive in case-studies for TGC markets in Britain, Sweden,
and Texas. Further he argues that there is an asymmetric
risk of over-investment, resulting in collapsing certificate
prices and thus capital losses. Either, this will prevent
the investor from building new capacity or the investor
would require a significant risk premium as compensa-
tion. Haas et al. [20] find that the intrinsic stability of
FIT systems appears to be a key element in the success
of these systems. Further, they find that TGC systems
show to be less effective with respect to deployment of
less mature RES-E. This view is agreed upon by Bergek &
Jacobsson [21] and Midttun & Gautesen [22]. They also
suggest that FIT regimes and TGC markets should be
seen as complementary regulatory instruments targeting
subsequent steps in the product cycle. Agnolucci [23]
argues that long-term contracts offered to producers will
yield more certainty for green investors, and thus lower
the price of certificates. Van der Linden also discusses
cases where retailers are obliged to offer such long-term
contracts. In these cases the TGC market is gradually
converging towards a FIT regime [24]. Building on
a classical theory of commodity storage presented by
Wright & Williams [25] and Deaton & Laroque [26],
Amundsen et al. [27] find that banking reduces price
volatility significantly and also lowers average prices.
Based on the model presented in [5], Khazaei et al. [28]
suggest a new compliance policy that they show will
reduce the price volatility of certificates.
In this TGC market, called the Swedish-Norwegian
Electricity Certificate Market, the target is to achieve
an additional 26.4 TWh of annual renewable gener-
ation. Supply is established by letting the regulator
decide which projects fulfill the requirements for being
certificate-eligible. Once qualified, these producers are
awarded a number of certificates based on their actual
monthly eligible production. New power plants have to
be in operation by the end of 2020 to receive certificates.
Certificates are then received monthly for a period of
15 years from the time operations start. Producers are
allowed to bank their certificates and may time their
certificate sales to maximize profits, i.e. either by selling
immediately or by waiting for higher expected prices.
Demand is established by imposing a requirement on
each individual retailer as a proportion of the actual
amount of electricity he has sold to his customers. If
a retailer does not fulfill this requirement by holding
enough certificates at the compliance dates, he is fined a
penalty fee. The penalty fee is calculated as 1.5 times the
average price over the 12 months prior to the compliance
date. At the compliance date, March 31 every year,
the required amount of certificates is handed in and
cancelled. Certificates are traded in the spot and futures
market, both over-the-counter and on the Nasdaq OMX.
Despite the clear need for better understanding of
the price dynamics in a TGC market, there is a lim-
ited amount of academic research addressing the price
volatility and stabilization mechanisms of such markets.
This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding
of the dynamics in such markets, through a case-study
on the Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market.
A flexible way of modeling this TGC market, based
on stochastic dynamic programming, is proposed. The
proposed model extends the work of Coulon et al. [5] on
the New Jersey SREC market, by adding the penalty fee
as a state variable and including relationships between
investments, the electricity market and the Levelized
Cost of Energy (LCoE). Further, it incorporates all the
important features in a TGC market, such as the in-
vestment rate, the requirement level, the penalty level
and a stochastic production of eligible electricity. By
providing a better understanding of the formation of
price expectations, the investment rationale and the
role of uncertainty, the paper contributes to the ongoing
debate on the design of energy policies. The proposed
model can also be a supplemental tool for market actors
and regulators.
Chapter 2 aims to give an overview of the dynamics
in the market, including how price expectations are
formed, the effects of a price dependent penalty and how
investment decisions are made. Chapter 3 proposes a
method for assessing the investors’ expectations of elec-
tricity prices utilizing the two-factor model of Schwartz
& Smith [29]. The approach of Benth [30] is implemented
to extract smooth forward curves, which are further used
as input to a Kalman-filter, calibrating the two-factor
model. Chapter 4 introduces the electricity certificate
model. A mathematical formulation of the model is
provided, and the modeling of the different market dy-
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namics is explained. Further, the model implementation
is presented. Chapter 5 provides the calibration of the
model along with the results from the base-case. Chapter
6 provides an analysis of the market for different supply
and demand scenarios, different investment rationales
and for suggested policy changes. Chapter 7 gives some
concluding remarks about this certificate market and lists
some conditions for stable prices.
2. Market Dynamics
This chapter discusses market dynamics, including
how price expectations are formed, the effects of a price
dependent penalty and how investment decisions are
made. The reasoning behind the modeling choices made
in chapter 4 are also provided.
2.1. Price Expectations
The formation of certificate price expectations in the
market is of major importance. Demand for certificates is
based on the consumers’ total consumption of electricity.
This consumption is typically found to be fairly price
inelastic, however it is still exposed to annual variation,
as changes in consumer patterns cause changing de-
mand. Thus, the annual demand for certificates is not
easily predictable. Supply of certificates depends on
actual generation of electricity, which for most renewable
sources are affected by weather conditions. It is found to
vary between years in addition to a seasonal variance.
For Denmark, it is estimated that the maximum variation
in the annual wind power generation is approximately
±20%, with a standard deviation of approximately 10%
[27]. As the short-term marginal cost of wind energy
is close to zero, volatility in the supply of certificates
should be expected, as the production decision is based
on weather conditions rather than prices seen in the
market.
The following two conditions for explaining rational
formation of price expectations are suggested.
1. The certificate price pC should be such that the
marginal plant is profitable, i.e. the price should
equal the difference between the levelized cost of en-
ergy (LCoE) of the marginal plant, Lm, and the elec-
tricity price, pE.
pC = Lm   pE (1)
2. The certificate price should equal the discounted
value of the expected penalty, p, times the prob-
ability of having to pay this penalty, that is, the
probability of a shortage in the certificate balance, b.
pC = e rE[p]E[1{b=0}] (2)
The first condition follows from the expected prof-
itability of an investment in a TGC market. Normally, an
investment is profitable if the expected electricity price
is higher than the investment’s LCoE. In a TGC market,
decisions to invest in renewable electricity capacity
will be made on the basis of both expected electricity-
and certificate prices. Investments are assumed made
when the price of certificates is higher than the LCoE
of the plant less the price of electricity. Consequently,
the renewable plants with the lowest LCoE will be built
first, since these are profitable at a lower certificate price.
If the expected prices increase, so does the number of
profitable investments. However, expected prices should
at all times be such that the expected marginal plant is
profitable. Higher prices than this level will indicate that
the market is not perfectly competitive, as the price is
higher than the long-run marginal cost. One should note
that investors might hold a real option mindset, putting
a high value on the flexibility achieved by delaying
an investment, hence the required certificate price for
making an investment might be slightly higher than the
price suggested by (1).
The requirement imposed on the retailers is set such
that the investments will add up to a total of 26.4 TWh
of additional annual capacity. Thus, if the market works
as planned, combined with a perfect foresight of the
LCoE of the different investment opportunities, the price
level at the end of the investment period is predictable.
It is worth mentioning that new investments may cause
decreasing electricity prices, thus a higher certificate
price is required for the marginal plant to be profitable.
Realistically the LCoE curve is not known in detail by
all players in the market, thus creating slightly different
price expectations, which again intuitively will cause
more volatile prices. On the other hand, if new invest-
ments are less (more) than 26.4 TWh in the end of 2020
there will be a deficit (surplus) of certificates in the mar-
ket, and the price of certificates will start rising (falling).
Then the regulators are likely to implement changes in
market design, e.g. by extending the investment period
or reducing the requirement on retailers. Such regulatory
changes may cause increased volatility and thus an
increased required rate of return [17]. Increased required
rate of return results in an increased LCoE, thus a higher
certificate price will be needed for the marginal plant to
be profitable.
The second condition follows from the expected
payoff of a certificate. When new certificates are issued,
electricity producers are faced with the decision of
whether to sell their certificates immediately or bank
their certificates to wait for higher prices. Producers
will sell their certificates at the current price, unless the
present value of an expected future price exceeds the
current price. When the present value of a future price
is higher, producers will bank their certificates until
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the willingness to pay among retailers increases to a
level at which producers are willing to sell. Hence, a
player acting to maximize profit is likely to sell/bank his
certificates such that the market reaches an equilibrium
where the players are indifferent between selling today
and selling tomorrow. Along the lines of Carmona et al.
[9], the retailers’ willingness to pay is assumed equal to
the net present value of the penalty they expect imposed
if obligations are not met, times the probability of not
being able to meet these obligations, i.e. the probability
of a shortage of certificates in the market. Predicting
these penalty fees is difficult, as they are based on prices
observed over the preceding year of a given compliance
date. Following from this, in a period immediately after
a compliance date, no information is available for calcu-
lating the penalty fee of the next compliance date. As this
compliance date approaches, more information becomes
available. The probability of a shortage of certificates
is based on the current balance of certificates, issuance
of new certificates and the requirement imposed on
retailers. Lower balance increases expected prices, while
a lower requirement level decreases expected prices.
As stated in the introduction, both the requirement
and the issuance are subject to unpredictable variations
on an annual basis. Combined with the unpredictable
penalty level this may, as for the first price condition,
cause different price expectations, and thus more volatile
prices.
To achieve market equilibrium, both of the above
conditions should be met at the same time. For modeling
purposes, an interesting question is whether fulfilling one
of the conditions automatically leads to the fulfillment of
the other. For a market in equilibrium, one would expect
this to be the case. This has not been shown empirically,
it is however natural to assume that the suppliers of
certificates ensure the fulfillment of the first condition,
while the demand side ensures the fulfillment of the
second condition1.
2.2. Market Instability
The price dependent penalty causes some interesting
effects on price expectations and thus prices, and may
potentially cause large price increases or price drops.
This can be described as a mathematical instability. An
increase in the certificate price will lead to an increase in
the expected penalty, which subsequently may cause the
prices to rise even further. Given no intervention from
market regulators, this may result in a spiral that could
potentially lead to prices climbing without bounds or
collapsing towards zero, depending on the initial price
movement. As will be discussed below, there seems to
be some stabilizing factors in the market, which ensures
1Thanks to Ove Wolfgang for posing this question.
that spiraling prices do not occur.
For a TGCmarket in equilibrium, expected increases in
demand should be offset by a corresponding increase in
expected investments, hence stabilizing the market price.
However, in the event of unexpected price increases due
to new unexpected information, the lead time of new
generation capacity will cause the expected increase in
capacity to lag the observed increase in price, hence
causing a mismatch between supply and demand which
in turns causes prices to remain at a higher level for
some time period. The lead-time of new capacity will
decide the duration of the time period needed for the
system to stabilize at a new equilibrium level. In the
long run, the market will meet an unexpected increase in
certificate prices with an increased rate of investment in
renewable electricity capacity. This will cause the supply
of certificates to increase, which in turns causes falling
price expectations and finally lowered prices. Bio power
and dammed hydro could to some extent benefit from
these periods of higher prices by increasing production.
The percentage share of such ”stabilizing renewables” in
the mix of certificate-eligible electricity, will decide the
magnitude of the described instability.
The percentage share of stabilizing renewable energy
sources is low in this market and investments made after
2020 are not certificate-eligible. Hence, other mechanisms
are required to avoid the potential market instability.
Stabilizing price expectations will work as such a mech-
anism. If an initial price movement is not met with a
correspondingly large change in penalty expectations
and a subsequent change in price expectations, the
market will not be facing upward or downward spiraling
prices. Such stabilizing price expectations may stem
from a belief among actors that the regulators will act
in extreme cases to stabilize the system. This gives an
interesting finding about price expectations, particularly
that the price expectations are of major importance for
actual observed prices. If prices are expected to remain
in a stable area, they most likely will. If prices are
expected to change, they may start spiraling upwards or
downwards. Thus, a stable market requires stable price
expectations.
2.3. The Investment Decision and Expected Investments
Understanding the rationale behind the investment
decision is of major importance when modeling the
electricity certificate market. Currently, almost six years
remain of the investment period, leading to an expected
annual addition of 2.7 TWh’s of new renewable gen-
eration if the 26.4 TWh target is to be reached. One
essential question is whether the target will be met or
whether the total investments will be either lower or
higher than the target. Failing to reach the target would
again cause prices to rise or fall as described in chapter
4
2.1. Predicting the timing and the level of investments
is essential to understanding the rationale behind the
investment decision. Below, three such rationales are
suggested.
1. A given number of investments will be made annu-
ally regardless of the prices and costs.
This rationale stems from an assumption that when
prices are situated within an expected price range,
a sufficient amount of profitable investment oppor-
tunities exist to reach the 26.4 TWh target.2 Thus,
all investors that believe their investment opportu-
nities to be among the cheapest will make their in-
vestments independent of price movements. Specif-
ically in Norway, there are investment opportunities
in hydro power that are profitable even if certificates
become worthless. These investments may then be
made even if the investor knows that this will cause
over-investments, and thus a collapse in certificate
prices. In the opposite case when the profitability
of all investment opportunities depend on the certifi-
cate price, it is assumed that the investment will not
be made if it will cause the total capacity to exceed
the target. Additionally, considering the significant
lead times of the different technologies, investment
decisions must soon be made if the new plants are to
be considered certificate-eligible. As a result of this,
a potential theory could be that all the power plants
needed to reach the 26.4 TWh target of new capacity
have already been planned. If this is the case, move-
ments in certificate price will be of little to no impor-
tance for new investments.
Table 1: Lead Time on Investments
RES-E Lead Time (years)
Bio 2-5
Dammed Hydro 3-4
Run-of-river Hydro 1-2
Wind 1-2
2. The investment decision is based solely on the
certificate price, and a positive feedback from in-
creased prices on the investment level is expected.
Independent of the electricity prices and the cost
structures, the rationale suggests that there exists a
number of profitable investment opportunities, and
that the number is increasing as certificate prices
increases.
3. The investment decision is based on the profit equa-
tion for a certificate-eligible power plant operating
2Information from a key producer in the Norwegian electricity mar-
ket indicates that their development of new hydro power plants does
not depend on prices, but solely on access to capital.
in a TGC market, i.e. investments will be made if the
sum of the electricity price and the certificate price
less the LCoE of the current investment opportunity
is greater than zero. If the certificate price is formed
according to the first price formation condition pre-
sented in 2.1, a plant is profitable in the long run
if its LCoE is lower than the LCoE of the marginal
plant. Further, stemming from this investment ratio-
nale, the expected rate of investments will be chang-
ing directly with a changed expectation of a power
plant’s marginal profit.
2.4. Assumptions and Model Choices
This subsection aims to explain the choices of modeling
presented in chapter 4 based on the previous discussion.
The background for the price equation, the investment
equation, the issuance equation and the penalty equation
are presented.
The price equation is modeled in accordance with the
second price condition presented in (2), i.e. the certificate
price should equal the discounted value of the expected
penalty times the probability of having to pay this
penalty. This relationship is chosen, since it is expected to
best capture the dynamics in the market throughout the
period. The short-term marginal cost of a certificate after
the investment decision is made is approximately zero.
The suppliers of certificates will thus be willing to sell
certificates at significantly lower prices than suggested
by (1). Fluctuations are thus assumed to be captured
better by (2). Particularly in scenarios where supply
exceeds (falls behind) demand, certificate prices are
expected to decline (incline). However, for scenarios with
stable expectations for supply and demand, one would
assume the price expectations also to be in accordance
with the condition presented in (1). It is also noted that
having one or a few of the actors in the market acting
according to the assumed relations would suffice for the
relations to hold. Amundsen & Bergman [31] support
these rational price expectations. They conclude that
the problem of market power will be eliminated for a
common Swedish-Norwegian certificate market.
The issuance equation describes the monthly issuance
of certificates, and is chosen to be modeled such that it
is subject to both seasonal and annual variance. This
captures the fluctuations in generation stemming from
renewable energy sources, and especially wind power,
due to changing weather conditions. For valuation
purposes, the annual fluctuations in issuance of certifi-
cates are of greatest importance, since the requirement
imposed on retailers is only fulfilled annually. Thus,
seasonal variances should not affect the certificate price.
The investment equation is modeled as a combination
of the first and third investment rationales presented
in section 2.3, i.e. some investments are occurring as a
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function of time only, while some investments occur if
the sum of the expected certificate and electricity price
exceeds the LCoE of the investment opportunity. Time
dependent investments are included, since several power
plants have already been planned and found profitable
within a reasonable price range. Other investors are
expected to delay their investment decision until their
project becomes profitable. These are expected to base
their decision on their expectations of certificate and
electricity price. Modeling investments in this way is also
expected to capture the downward pressure on prices
caused by new investments. The result should be an
adequate number of investments, such that the target of
26.4 TWh of new capacity is met, and prices neither climb
nor collapse.
The penalty equation is modeled such that the ex-
pected penalty is a function of all information known in
a given month, i.e. the expected penalty equals 1.5 times
the average of the current price and the prices over the
months preceding the last compliance date. An exception
has been made for the first month following a compliance
date, where the expected penalty is calculated as the
average of 1.5 times the current price and the actual ob-
served penalty the previous year. The reasoning behind
this modeling choice stems from an assumption that
agents would believe the prices to remain in a stable area
throughout the period and thus only use the currently
available prices to form their expectations of the penalty.
3. Electricity Price Simulation
Including a dependency between investments and elec-
tricity prices entails amethod of assessing and forecasting
the investors’ long-term expectations of future electricity
prices. For this, a Schwartz-Smith 2-factor model [29] has
been used:
Xt = ct + xt (3)
Here ct and xt are unobserved state variables represent-
ing time t short term deviation in log prices and time t
equilibrium levels for log prices respectively. Short run
deviations (ct) are assumed to revert towards zero fol-
lowing an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dct =  kctdt + scdzc, (4)
while equilibrium level (xt) is assumed to follow a Brow-
nian motion process
dxt = µxdt + sxdzx . (5)
The unobserved state variables have been estimated
using a Kalman filter process. In typical implementations
of the Kalman filter procedure, missing data problems
are severe [32]. These known shortcomings have been
overcome utilizing Benth et al.’s method [30] for ex-
tracting smooth forward curves from average-based
commodity contracts with seasonal variation. For any
given time, there exists futures contracts with settlement
over the next month, quarter and year. This means that
for the same date, several futures prices are observed.
The contracts can be interpreted as swaps, as they are
swapping a fixed price commodity against a floating
price commodity in the settlement period. Benth et al.’s
method takes these observed contracts and create smooth
forward curves, fitting the contracts to a seasonality
function under a maximum smoothness criteria. For
any given time to expiry, the resulting forward curves
can be interpreted as the future price on a contract with
daily settlement. Further, these are used as input to the
Kalman filter. The construction of forward curves will
cause some information loss, but is necessary given the
nature of delivery in the electricity market.
Furthermore, following from the output of the
Schwartz-Smith 2-factor model, the long-term equilib-
rium level has been used as input for the electricity cer-
tificate model. This is motivated by the assumption that
the long-term prices are the ones that are relevant to in-
vestors making investment decisions. The expected long-
term equilibrium level of the electricity prices is given by
(6).
ln(E[St]) = E[Xt] +
1
2
Var[Xt]
= e ktc0 + x0 + µx t
+
1
2
 
(1  e 2kt)s
2
c
2k
+ s2x t + 2(1  e kt)
rcxscsx
k
! (6)
4. Electricity Certificate Model
The Electricity Certificate model extends Coulon et al.’s
modeling of the New Jersey Solar Renewable Electricity
Certificate (SREC) and the equations described in their
paper [5]. A noticeable difference between the New Jer-
sey and the Swedish-Norwegian market is that while
the New Jersey market has a fixed penalty, the Swedish-
Norwegian market has a penalty that is dependent on the
average of the prices observed over the course of the pre-
ceding year. The inclusion of this feature has required the
introduction of another state variable, penalty p. Addi-
tionally, the model has been extended to include a depen-
dency between investments, LCoE and electricity prices.
The possibility of infinite certificate banking, present in
the Swedish-Norwegian market has also been included.
Further, parameters have been estimated to reflect his-
torical values from the Swedish market over the period
2004-2011.
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4.1. Mathematical Formulation
pCt = max
v2{[t],[t]+1,...,T}
e r(v t)E[pt]Et[1{bv=0}] (7a)
pCt = e
 rDtE(pCt+1) when t /2 N (7b)
As discussed in chapter 2.4, the modeling of the price is
based on (1). At a compliance date, the holder of a certifi-
cate will avoid the penalty imposed on those who do not
comply as he hands in his certificate. Further, if the bal-
ance of certificates in the market directly following a com-
pliance date is 0, one can assume that investors would
have been willing to pay the amount of the penalty fee for
one certificate. Eq. (7a) states that at any time t, the value
of the certificate pt is the maximum of the discounted ex-
pected future penalty fees it can be used to avoid, dis-
counted at the rate r times the probability of having to
pay this penalty. Eq. (7b), i.e. the Martingale condition,
follows implicitly from (7a) and states that, except at com-
pliance dates, the current price is the discounted expected
future price.
bt =
(
max(0, bt 1 +
R t
t 1 gudu  Rt) t 2 N
b[t] 1 +
R t
t 1 gudu t /2 N
(8)
Eq. (8) is a standard inventory equation, and keeps
track of the accumulated number of certificates, banking,
in the market at any given time. At any time step t, the
currently banked balance bt is a function of the previous
balance b[t] 1 and the accumulated issuance since the pre-
vious time step,
R t
t 1 gudu. If the current time step is part
of the set of compliance dates N, (8) accounts for a re-
duction in the number of certificates in the market, equal
to the requirement Rt at the given date. The balance can
never be negative, hence the max statement.
gt = gˆt(pC , pE) exp (a1 sin(4pt) + a2 cos(4pt)+
a3 sin(2pt) + a4 cos(2pt) + #
g
t )
(9)
The seasonality and annual variation in eligible elec-
tricity generation, and hence certificate issuance, dis-
cussed in 2.4, is accounted for by a seasonality function
and a stochastic process on the form shown in (9). The
state variable gˆt represents the certificate-eligible annual
capacity and is a function of the certificate price, electric-
ity price and LCoE. This is motivated by the assumption
that investors are likely to invest more while prices are
high. Seasonal changes are modeled by the sine and co-
sine functions, while a noise term is added to reflect the
uncertainty in annual generation from wind and hydro.
ln(gˆt+Dt)  ln(gˆt)
Dt
= a5 + a6(max(0, (pEt + sxdzx)
+p¯Ct   Lt))  Ct, for a5 2 R, a6 > 0
(10)
As discussed in chapter 2.4, rationale 1 and rationale
3 will be used as background for modeling new invest-
ments. Eq. (10) accounts for the monthly change in
certificate-eligible generation capacity. The parameter a6
accounts for the logical effect that producers are likely to
invest more as the marginal profits associated with the
investment rises. a5 represents the growth of generation
not related to marginal profit. It is an independent term
describing the drift in investments over time. A noise
term sxdzx representing the uncertainty in the equilib-
rium level is added to the forecasted electricity price. Ct
represents the monthly phase-out of certificates, occur-
ring when a power plant has received certificates for 15
years.
E[pt] =(
1.5 ·Âi=ti=1+max{1,N|{N<t}}
pi
t max{1,N|{N<t}} t  1 /2 N
1.5 · ( pt2 + pt Dt2 ) t  1 2 N
(11)
As discussed in chapter 2.4 the expected penalty will
be modeled with an assumption that agents only use cur-
rently available price information in theur formation of
penalty expectations. Eq. (11) states that at all times, the
penalty level should be 1.5 times the average of prices
observed since the last compliance date, except in the
first month after the compliance date, where the expected
penalty is 1.5 times the average of the current price and
the actual observed penalty the previous year.
p¯Ct = p
C
t (12)
It is here assumed, as stated in (12), that the investment
decision is made based on the current price. This follows
since the model captures all future price expectations in
the current price. Following from this relation, is an im-
mediate price feedback on certificate-eligible generation
capacity. This is done to avoid the inclusion of another
state variable, hence reducing dimensionality and pre-
serving the computational tractability. The assumption
could be justified further by Coulon et al. [5], who find
the lead-time to have modest impact on price forecasts.
4.2. Implementation
The solution algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. A 3-D grid of values for bt, gˆt and pt is chosen. For
bt and gˆt, the lower bounds are zero and the upper
bounds are a little above the largest requirement. For
pt the lower bound is zero and the upper bound is
a little above the highest expected penalty. Time is
discretized in monthly steps, matching the frequency
of historical generation data.
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2. The dynamic program is initialized, evaluating the
payoff of the certificate at the end of the market’s life
t = T for every gridpoint (bt, gˆt,pt). At this point, all
information is known and hence, the program yields
digital boundary price cubes:
(a) At grid points where there is a shortage of cer-
tificates (i.e. the balance is less than the require-
ment), investors are willing to pay the penalty,
pCT = pT , for one certificate.
(b) At grid points where there is a surplus of certifi-
cates (i.e. the balance is higher than the require-
ment), investors are willing to pay pCT = 0 for
one certificate.
3. From the boundary cube at t = T, the dynamic
program steps backward to t = (T   1). Here it
solves eqs. (7)-(12) and finds a price at every grid
point using price information from the price cube at
t = T. The same procedure is then followed for ev-
ery time step; information from price cube t + 1 is
used to solve eqs. (7)-(12), finding a price at every
grid point of price cube t with the FORTRAN sub-
routine nag roots withdraw sys func easy (c05nb) from
the NAG Toolbox for Matlab [33], utilizing the Pow-
ell hybrid method.
The algorithm provides a price cube at every single
time step. The price cubes show what the price would be
at this time step, given a state (bt, gˆt,pt). An example of
the content of these cubes is shown in Figure 1, plotting
the prices obtained for a chosen p over the grid bt, gˆt
for December 2020. For the given resolution level, the
runtime of this procedure is approximately 1 hour on
an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU, multithreading at 3.4
GHz on all 4 available cores. Parallel processing and
FORTRAN subroutines have been introduced to keep
the model computationally tractable. This is discussed
further in an appendix to the corresponding Master’s
thesis introduction. [34].
From the algorithm presented above, the prices for every
combination of state variables are found and stored in a 4-
dimensional matrix. Furthermore, starting from the cur-
rently observed certificate-eligible capacity gˆ0, accumu-
lated certificates in the market b0, penalty level p0 and
time t0, the state transition equations are used to obtain
the certificate price, pCt , certificate-eligible capacity gˆt, ac-
cumulated certificates in the market bt and penalty level
pt for every time step throughout the period.
5. Calibration and Base-Case
This chapter describes the calibration of the model and
provides results from the model for a base-case.
5.1. Model Input Estimation
The Schwartz-Smith procedure described briefly in chap-
ter 3 yields the results shown in Figure 2. The figure
Figure 1: Price surface for t = 69 (December, 2020). Profit feedback (a6) =
1⇥ 10 4
Figure 2: Schwartz-Smith 2-factor model output
shows estimated prices, observed prices and equilibrium
price. As seen by the figure, the time series model repli-
cates observed prices quite well. Eq. (6) and parameters
obtained by the Schwartz-Smith procedure, shown in Ta-
ble 2, are in turns used to calculate the long-term equilib-
rium level shown in Figure 3. This is used as a proxy for
the investors expectations of the electricity price.
The input data for compliance requirements Rt and the
LCoE curve are based on numbers received from the Nor-
wegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate3 and the
Swedish Energy Agency [35] [36] [37].4 The annual re-
quirement is calculated based on their forecasts of elec-
tricity consumptionmultipliedwith the requirement quo-
tas. Further, all known investments opportunities are
sorted in ascending order based on their estimated LCoE.
It is assumed that the less expensive investments are
made first. Thus, in every month a certain number of
investments is assumed to be made. The less expensive
investment opportunity in the next month will then have
a similar or higher LCoE than in the current month. Re-
peating this procedure for every month yields a time-
3Courtesy of Leif Inge Husabø, The Norwegian Water Resources
and Energy Directorate
4The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate and the
Swedish Energy Agency are the regulators of this certificate market.
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Table 2: Parameters for the electricity price dynamics obtained from the
Kalman filter
k sc lc µx sc rc,x c0 x0
5.15 0.84 -1.21 -0.01 0.20 -0.17 3.19 -1.56
Figure 3: Schwartz-Smith long-term factor
dependent LCoE curve.5 Cost reductions from technol-
ogy development is omitted as the investment period
only lasts until 2020. The timing of phase-out of power
plants has been calculated based on data from all 4557
power plants currently accepted as certificate-eligible and
expected annual investments. The discount rate used in
the price equation has been set to 9.5%. This reflects the
required rates of return at which the retail sellers in the
Scandinavian electricity market operate.6 The discount
rate assumed in the calculation of LCoE for investments
opportunities in Norway and Sweden has been set to re-
spectively 4% and 8% by the NorwegianWater Resources
and Energy Directorate and the Swedish Energy Direc-
torate. Further, historical data on issuance of certificates
and prices, provided by NECS [38] have been used to cal-
ibrate the stochastic generation function.
ln(gt) = a0 + a1sin(4pt) + a2cos(4pt) + a3sin(2pt)+
a4cos(2pt) + a5t + a6(max(0, pElt + p¯
C
t   LCOE(t))) + #gt
(13)
In (13), (9), (10) and (12) have been combined to allow
for parameter fitting, determining coefficients used in
these equations from historical data. The regression,
yields the regression coefficients shown in Table 3. The
bootstrapped confidence intervals of these coefficients
are shown in Table 4.
Since the regression is nonlinear, the goodness of fit is
assessed based on the coefficient standard errors, the
coefficient confidence intervals and a visualization of the
5The LCoE for the relevant time-period spans from e 30/MWh to
e 46/MWh.
6Courtesy of Bjørn Erik Heiberg, Pareto (A Norwegian financial ad-
visory firm)
Table 3: Regressed parameters for the certificate issuance seasonality
function (13)
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
13.627 0.070 0.010 -0.309 0.221 0.087 0.0001
Table 4: Confidence Intervals of Regressed Coefficients
2.5% 97.5%
a0 13.58 13.67
a1 0.046 0.094
a2 -0.015 0.034
a3 -0.334 -0.285
a4 0.197 0.245
a5 0.007 0.008
a6 -0.024 0.012
regression shown in Figure 47. Testing and concluding
on whether the relationship between marginal profit
and generation, i.e. a6, is significantly different from
zero is difficult. It is however likely that the coefficient
is positive, since some level of profit feedback is expected.
The Q-Q-plot of the residuals is shown in Figure 5, and
indicates that the error terms are close to normally dis-
tributed [39], though there are some outliers in the lower
left and the upper right corner. It is also noticed that
the residuals do not show any patterns of autocorrela-
tion. The residuals seem to be independent and normally
distributed. The characteristics of the error term, shown
in Table 5, are obtained. As seen, the residuals demon-
strate some excess kurtosis, it is however close to zero and
hence does not change the assumption that a normal dis-
tribution can be used to simulate noise. Neither does the
slight negative skewness of the error terms [40]. Based on
this discussion, it is decided to use a normal distribution
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 0.080 for
the renewable generation noise term #gt in (9). For the elec-
tricity price stochastic term, sxdzx , the standard deviation
sx obtained from the calibration of the Schwartz-Smith
long term factor x has been used.
Table 5: Error term characteristics for the renewable generation regres-
sion
Mean Std. Dev. Skew Excess Kurt.
0.000 0.080 -0.628 0.106
5.2. Model Output for the Base-Case Scenario
This section presents the base-case for the simulation
of the certificate market. The model is run for the input
7For nonlinear regressions, metrics like R2 and the p-stat are not
suitable for assessing the goodness of fit. These metrics are based on the
assumption that the regression is linear.
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Figure 4: Eligible renewable generation (issuance) and regression fit
Figure 5: Normal Q-Q Plot of Standardized Residuals
described in section 5.1 from April 2015 until the last
compliance date in March 2035. The requirement quota
adjustment, suggested by the regulators to the 2015
market progress review8, has been included [37]. The
resulting Figure 6 presents certificate prices, balance
of certificates, certificate-eligible investments and the
normal annual production of electricity from eligible
power plants.
Figure 6a shows stable, but declining prices. The red
line represents the average of 100 model realizations
represented by the blue lines. Especially towards the
end of the period a great variance between scenarios is
observed. It is noticed that the modeled price for April
2015, e 18.34/MWh, is slightly higher than the price
actually observed in the market, e 16.33/MWh. As the
market approaches its planned end in 2035, the modeled
prices decline rapidly towards zero. This is due to an
expected surplus of certificates throughout the market’s
lifetime. A time passes, the probability of scenarios
resulting in a future deficit of certificates decreases.
Similar results can be found in [14].
Figure 6b plots the accumulated investment in
certificate-eligible capacity, as forecasted by the model,
8Progress reviews are scheduled every fourth year to decide on reg-
ulatory changes to the market structure.
against time. A stable increase in investments is seen
until the end of the investment period (2020). The
parameter estimation from the regression in chapter 5.1
is used for the base-case. The time-dependent term was
found to be substantially larger than the profit feedback
term, thus the time-dependent term accounts for a large
proportion of the expected investments. This results in
a low level of uncertainty in the number of investments.
Several different scenarios for the investment relation
will be presented below. As seen from the figure, the
model expects the target of 26.4 TWh’s of additional
capacity from renewable energy sources to be met.
One can assume that the market is designed so that
a small certificate surplus is expected if the market’s
investment target is met. This is reflected in Figure 6c.
The target is met and a stable balance surplus is seen
throughout the period. The monthly incline in the certifi-
cate balance represents the expected monthly production
of electricity, which in turns reflects the monthly issuance
of certificates. The steep declines occurring annually
represent the required quantities of certificates being
cancelled at compliance dates.
Figure 6d shows the expected level of certificate-
eligible annual capacity. Until the end of 2020 the eligible
capacity is expected to increase due to investments seen
in Figure 6b. In 2018 the first power plants declared
certificate-eligible have received certificates for 15 years
and the first phase-out of certificate-eligible capacity
occurs. In Figure 6d this is best seen in the decline after
2020, when no new investments receive certificates. In
2035, when the market is planned to end, all the power
plants have been phased out.
6. Analysis
This chapter aims to analyse and discuss how the mar-
ket changes proposed by regulators for the 2015 progress
review will impact the market. Additionally, changes in
certificate supply and demand, different alternatives for
the investment decision rationale and different mecha-
nisms for forming penalty fee expectations, have been
explored. Unless stated otherwise, input variables are
equal to those presented in the base-case discussion.
6.1. Changes in Certificate Demand
Certificate demand is based on the actual observed
consumption of electricity. Hence, a lower electricity
consumption will yield a lower certificate demand.
This section aims to investigate the effects of changes
in electricity consumption. In figure 7, three scenarios
with a varying level of electricity consumption have been
compared to the base-case.
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(a) 100 price realizations and average (red curve) (b) Accumulated Investments
(c) Banking (d) Green Certificate-Eligible Annual Capacity
Figure 6: Base Case Illustrations
Figure 7a shows how a lower electricity consump-
tion, and hence, certificate demand, yields lower prices
throughout the period. This is natural as the probability
of scenarios with a shortage of certificates decreases
with an increased certificate balance. Correspondingly, a
higher electricity consumption yields a lower certificate
balance, and hence, higher prices throughout the period.
The mechanism is illustrated well by Figure (7b which
relates the minimum annual balance to the price level.
The effect is observed to be noticeable even for small
changes in demand. A realistic variance in eligible
electricity production is found to cause similar variance
in certificate prices. In both cases, extreme scenarios
forcing prices to climb without bounds or collapsing
towards zero can be seen. This illustrates the importance
of stability in demand and supply for the formation
of stable prices. Market actors report the estimation
of consumption as a source of uncertainty [41]. This
is supported by the large price changes seen from the
model even for slight adjustments of input parameters.
The updated forecast for the electricity consumption,
provided by the Norwegian regulator, shows an annual
3-7% adjustment compared to the forecast provided at
the launch of the market. Thus, such variation in the
requirement can be considered realistic.
6.2. Regulators’ Suggested Market Changes for the 2015
Progress Review
The regulators’ suggestions for the 2015 Progress Re-
view include four main elements. These are:
1. A slight adjustment of the quota path, to balance the
market.
2. Extending the investment period to the end of 2021
while shifting the quota path upwards to compen-
sate for the increasing supply.
3. Increasing the target of additional renewable energy
capacity to 28.4 TWh by shifting the quota path up-
wards.
4. Increasing the number of power plants in the Nor-
wegian transition system.9
The suggested adjustment of the quota path has al-
ready been included in the base-case, the other suggested
changes are discussed in the following section.
Figure 8 shows the forecasted price and balance if new
investments were to be considered certificate-eligible un-
til the end of 2021. An extension of the investment period
lowers the probability of good investments missing out
on the system benefits due to lead-time issues. However,
9The Norwegian transition system allows for power plants built be-
fore the 2012 market launch to receive certificates over a given time
frame. These do not count as part of the target fulfillment and are offset
by an increase in the the requirement quota for the Norwegian retailers.
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(a) 100 price realizations and average (red curve)
(b) Yearly Minimum Balance
Figure 7: Varying the Quota Level R
as seen some from Figure 8b some of the investments
are not expected to be made until 2021. This leads to
a lower issuance of certificates in the preceding years,
causing long-term effect on both certificate balance and
certificate prices. The lowered issuance lowers balance,
and thus higher and more volatile certificate prices
are forecasted throughout the period. Approaching
2035, large variations between the generated market
realizations are observed, following from uncertainty
among actors of whether enough certificates will be
available to fulfill the certificate obligations. If a deficit
of certificates is expected, the prices will start climbing
years in advance, consequently the penalty fee could
start spiraling upwards. This scenario illustrates the
importance of timing new investments. Even for this
modest system change, both the expected prices and the
volatility increases significantly. The regulators could
avoid such effects by making appropriate changes to the
requirement quotas.
Figure 9 shows forecasted prices and certificate balance
given the inclusion of power plants in the Norwegian
transition system to the market. The change accounts for
a total of 2 TWh’s of additional annual certificate-eligible
generation capacity being included in the market over a
period of 11 years. Figure 9 illustrates that forecasts are
almost unchanged compared to the base-case. For this
scenario the requirement quota levels have been updated
accordingly. This further strengthens the importance
of the requirement level even for small changes to the
market structure.
(a) 100 price realizations and average (red curve)
(b) Accumulated Investments
Figure 8: Extension of the investment period to the end of 2021
Figure 10 presents the expected prices and balance
following an increase of the target to 28.4 TWh. The
expected reduction in certificate price caused by this
change is estimated to e 0.91/MWh in 2020. A linear
change in requirement quotas is assumed to account for
the additional issuance of certificates. For the first few
years, the prices are slightly higher than in the base-case,
they do however follow a similar path throughout the
period.
Common to all the suggested changes in regulations,
is the risk of investors losing their trust in a frequently
revised market. This may increase volatility, and thus
investors will require a higher rate of return on invest-
ments. Furthermore, considering a change in market
regulations, its effects on supply and demand should be
thoroughly assessed, as these are shown to impact prices
substantially. Frequent adjustments of requirement
quotas seem necessary in order to balance the system
as the regulators’ electricity consumption forecasts are
updated. As mentioned, estimating this consumption
has been reported by actors as a considerable source of
market uncertainty [41]. An alternative that might ease
the formation of market expectations could be to change
the requirement from a quota times the actual observed
consumption of electricity to an absolute number of cer-
tificate per year. Thus, the only uncertainty would be on
the supply side, with its stochastic issuance of certificates.
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(a) 100 price realizations and average (red curve)
(b) Balance
Figure 9: 2 TWh of additional small-hydro added through the Norwe-
gian transition system
6.3. Penalty Expectations
The expectations of the penalty fee is an important
factor in the forming of price expectations. An alter-
native to (11) is introduced in this section. While (11)
assumes that an actor in the market expects the yearly
average certificate price to equal the average of the
certificate prices seen since the last compliance date, the
proposed alternative assumes naive price expectations,
and proposes that an actor in the market expects the
certificates price over the remainder of the year to equal
the certificate price observed today. The expected penalty
fee can then be modeled as the weighted average of
prices observed since the previous compliance date and
prices expected over the remaining months of the year, i.e
the current price. Thus the current price is more heavily
weighted. Running the model with the updated penalty
expectation mechanism yielded the same results as from
the base-case. One could expect more volatile price
forecasts, as penalty expectations change more rapidly
in response to current price changes. Realizing that the
model output does not change suggests that the model is
able to capture future expected prices in the price forecast
of a given time step.
6.4. Investment Decision Rationale
Section 6.1 discusses the investment rationale. As seen
from the regressed parameters, weak signs of feedback
from expected profits or certificate prices on investments
are exhibited. This section will look at how a stronger
(a) 100 price realizations and average (red curve)
(b) Balance
Figure 10: Increased target to 28.4 TWh
feedback mechanism would influence the market. Fig-
ure 11 illustrates market forecast realizations given the
investment rationale in (10), for three different levels of
profit feedback, a6, on investments, and a fixed time de-
pendent drift term. Figure 12 illustrates a scenario given
the investment rationale in (14), where the certificate price
is assumed to drive investments alone.
ln(gˆt+Dt)  ln(gˆt)
Dt
= a7 p¯Ct , for , a7 > 0 (14)
Figure 11 illustrates that for a medium and high profit
feedback on investments, only small differences in fore-
casts are observed. This is due to the downward-pressure
on certificate prices resulting from new investments.
Even for very high feedback, the accumulated invest-
ments does not increase much as this is expected by the
model to cause a collapse in certificate prices. Thus the
two scenarios turn out nearly identical. The scenario
with a lower feedback yields higher prices. This stems
from total investments being slightly below the 26.4
TWh target, thus causing a lower certificate issuance
and balance throughout the period. Compared to the
base-case, the resulting prices are lower throughout the
period and inclining in the first few years. This stems
from more investments in the beginning of the period,
decreasing certificate prices, followed by a slightly higher
balance throughout the period. Concluding from this,
a higher profit feedback on investments yields higher
investments, and hence lower prices, until a certain
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Figure 11: Prices for different levels of profit feedback on investments.
The time-dependent drift term (a5) = 0.072
Figure 12: Prices from the model with a modified price-driven invest-
ment equation, the feedback parameter (a7)=0.005
level where further investments are unprofitable due
to the low certificate price. Figure 12 presents lower
prices throughout the period. This is due to accumulated
investments being higher than the target, thus increasing
the supply of certificates. This shows that when invest-
ments are solely driven by the certificate price scenarios,
over-investment is more likely to occur. Realistically,
such scenarios may happen if less expensive hydro
power investments are made even if the market target is
exceeded, as these power plants are profitable even for a
low certificate price.
7. Conclusions
This paper looks into the performance of the Swedish-
Norwegian Electricity Certificate Market. The purpose is
to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of
the Swedish-Norwegian Electricity Certificate market, to
investigate the consequences of changes in the dynamics
and to investigate consequences of the changes in market
structure suggested by regulators for the 2015 progress
review. The certificate prices are expected to remain
at the current level over the next few years, they are
however expected to decline steadily towards zero as the
market approaches its planned end. It is found that small
changes to the market structure or small changes in the
levels of electricity generation or consumption may cause
large shifts in certificate price.
The current certificate price is already in the lower
price range. Recent news have shown Norwegian wind
projects being abandoned due to the low certificate
and electricity prices. The results of this analysis show
no evident signs of an imminent increase in certificate
prices. The investment target is however expected to be
met as profitable investment opportunities are believed
to exist, especially in Sweden where a beneficial tax
regime will benefit wind power investments until July
2016. If the investment target is not met, significantly
higher prices are expected due to certificate shortage.
It is worth noticing that the forecast does not seem to
meet this increase with increased investments. This is
due to the foreseen fall in expected certificate prices as
new investments contribute to meeting the target. Thus,
investments requiring a higher certificate price are not
necessarily made. On the other hand, if the target is
exceeded the certificate price will drop towards zero. It is
however assumed, and also shown in the analysis, that
this is not expected, since an investor is not believed to
invest in a project causing the certificate price to remain
at a significantly lower level. Thus, to meet the target,
a sufficient number of investments must be profitable
at the current price level and investors have to adjust
their decision making to the actions of others to avoid
over-investing. Concluding from this, it is found that
technologies which only require a small subsidy to be-
come profitable will be promoted through the certificate
market, while new and more expensive technologies will
not. This is also in accordance with theory of certificate
markets, stating that at any time the least expensive
investment will be made.
Periodic adjustments of the requirement quotas are
found to be necessary to achieve stable prices throughout
the lifetime of the market. While the stochastic nature of
the issuance cannot be easily addressed, the uncertainty
in the requirement is addressable. An alternative design
that may ease the formation of price expectations could
be to change the requirement of certificates to an absolute
quantity, rather than the quota level multiplied with
the electricity consumption. The required quantity of
certificates will then have to be split between the retailers
of electricity. This gives the market actors perfect infor-
mation about the total annual certificate demand and
the uncertainty left will be limited to the issuance of cer-
tificates, i.e. the generation of eligible electricity and the
magnitude of the penalty fee. For such scenarios, more
stable prices would be expected, declining within a range
representing the uncertainty in electricity generation, as
shown in the base-case in chapter 6.
The main challenge for this market is found to be the
difficulties in forming rational price expectations. Slight
changes in generation of eligible electricity or consump-
tion of electricity are shown to cause considerable price
movements. The actors in the market report that they
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want more predictable supply and demand allowing for
better forecasts of the market development. It is also
found that the price depends largely on the behavior of
the market participants. In particular, the possibility of
over-investment constitutes a threat to the market stabil-
ity. Further, it is found that the price-based penalty accel-
erates price change to a new equilibrium level, and causes
more volatile prices. Recently, several changes to the mar-
ket have been suggested by the regulators. Our analy-
sis shows that these may not influence the price if the
requirement quotas are changed accordingly. However,
it is not obvious how these changes in the quota level
should be made. Therefore, it is difficult for actors in
the market to estimate certificate price changes following
adjustments in market design. Concluding from this, it
is shown that investors will make their investment deci-
sions under a lot of uncertainty, thus low fixed-cost tech-
nologies may be prioritized before high fixed-cost tech-
nologies. Improvements made to stabilize the market
could be beneficial.
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Abstract—This paper explores the Swedish-Norwegian
market for electricity certificates, which is a support scheme
for investments in renewable electricity production. Produc-
ers investing in new renewable capacity receive certificates
based on their actual production. Retailers of electricity are
required to buy certificates for a proportion of their total
sales. If a retailers obligation is not met, a penalty fee is
imposed. The certificates are traded both bilaterally and as
a financial instrument on the Nasdaq Commodity Exchange.
The design and potential success of this multistate support
mechanism will be of great interest to policy makers and
green investors. The dynamic equilibrium model of Coulon,
Khazaei, Powell (2014) is adapted to the Swedish market. It
is found to replicate historical long-term trends and price
levels well. Sensitivity analyses show that the key drivers
of certificate prices are the penalty levels and the discount
rate. Further it is shown that a higher rate of certificate
price feedback on the investment rate dampens the price
fluctuations around the trend line. The rate of feedback is
uncertain, but is assessed to be larger than zero.
Index Terms—Renewable portfolio standards, Tradable
Green Certificates, Energy policy, Dynamic equilibrium, Mar-
ket analysis
I. THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN ELECTRICITY
CERTIFICATE MARKET
OVER the last decades, market-based energypolicies have grown more popular. The Tradable
Green Certificate (TGC) market in Sweden and Norway
is an example of such a market-based energy policy,
used by governments to promote the development of
increased renewable capacity in the electricity market.
In this TGCmarket, supply is established by letting the
regulator decide which projects fulfill the requirements
for receiving certificates. Once qualified, producers of
eligible electricity are awarded a number of certificates
based on their actual monthly production. Producers
are allowed to bank their certificates and may time
their certificate sales to maximize profits, i.e. either by
selling immediately or by waiting for higher expected
prices. Demand is then established by requiring retailers
to buy some of these certificates. The requirement
imposed on each individual retailer is based on the
amount of electricity he has sold to his customers. If
a retailer does not fulfill this requirement by holding
enough certificates at some specified compliance date,
he is fined a penalty fee. Since the required number of
certificates is calculated as a proportion of sold quantity,
the total demand for electricity certificates is based on
end users’ consumption of electricity. This demand for
electricity is typically found to be fairly inelastic, and
the total consumption is predictable within seasonal
variance.
One might argue who actually pays for these systems.
The legislation states that the costs should be charged
consumers over their electricity bill [1]. In his paper
from 2000, Morthorst, finds that the costs of such a
system is in fact carried by the consumers [2]. Since
electricity demand is inelastic, an increased electricity
price will not cause significant reductions in the quantity
of electricity consumed. Bye [3] disagrees with the view
of Morthorst. He argues that the costs of TGC markets
are actually paid by the producers. As more projects
become profitable, production volumes, and hence
supply, rise. According to Bye, this will cause lowered
retail prices, even though the certificate costs have been
added. Thus, the existing producers carry the costs of the
system, and consumers benefit from the lowered prices1.
The Swedish electricity certificate market was opened
in 2003, and is currently planned to last until 2035.
From January 2012, the market was extended to include
Norway [4]. By legislating the system, the lawmakers
seek to add an additional 26.4 TWh of annual renewable
capacity to the Swedish-Norwegian electricity market.
Electricity producers receive one certificate per 1 MWh
of generation for their eligible power plants. A power
plant declared eligible, will generate certificates during
its 15 first years of production. All sources of renewable
electricity production are equally entitled to certificates
and there are no requirements regarding how this new
capacity should be located geographically. This ensures
that more profitable projects are realized first. However
Swedish taxation rules make investing there favorable,
compared to investing in Norway. In a report from
2012, Thema Consulting Group concludes that ”up to
5.6 TWh of new renewable electricity in Norway, mainly
wind, but also hydro, will be crowded out by more
expensive Swedish wind power. The costs of meeting
the certificate target of 26.4 TWh will therefore be higher
than necessary” [5].
1Bye notes that the increased consumer surplus is exceeded by
the decrease in producer surplus, and hence, the total social surplus
experience a net decrease.
2II. PRICE DYNAMICS
A. Price Equilibrium
The formation of certificate price expectations in the
market is of major importance. Two conditions explain-
ing the rational formation of expectations are presented.
1) The certificate price should equal the difference
between the levelized cost of energy (LCoE) of the
marginal plant and the electricity price.
2) The certificate price should equal the discounted
value of the penalty times the probability of
having to pay this penalty.
The first condition follows from the way electricity
producers make investment decisions. In a TGC market,
decisions to invest in renewable electricity capacity
will be made on the basis of expected electricity- and
certificate prices. Assuming a fixed electricity price,
investments are made when the certificate price is
at a level that makes a new investment profitable.
This happens when the price of certificates is higher
than the LCoE of the plant less the price of electricity.
Consequently, the renewable plants with the lowest
LCoE will be built first, since these are profitable at
a lower certificate price. As prices increase, so does
the number of profitable investments. Subsequently,
investments will be made until the price of certificates
is equal to the LCoE of the marginal plant less the
electricity price. If the adaption to a price level of
certificates yielding a 26.4 TWh of additional capacity
is slower than planned, the regulators are likely to
implement changes in market design. Such regulatory
changes may cause increased volatility and thus an
increased required rate of return on investments [6].
Furthermore, the second condition follows from the
expected payoff of a certificate. When new certificates
are issued, electricity producers are faced with the
decision of whether to sell their certificates immediately
or bank their certificates to wait for higher prices.
Producers will sell their certificates at the current price,
unless the present value of an expected future price
exceeds the current price. When the present value
of a future price is higher, producers will bank their
certificates until the willingness to pay among retailers
increase to a level at which producers are willing to
sell. The retailers’ willingness to pay is assumed equal
to the expected penalty faced if obligations are not
met, times the probability of not being able to meet
these obligations, i.e. a shortage of certificates in the
market. Hence, a player acting to maximize profit is
likely to sell/bank his certificates such that he reaches
an equilibrium where he is indifferent between selling
today and selling tomorrow.
To achieve market equilibrium, both of the above
conditions should be met at the same time. For modeling
purposes, an interesting question is whether fulfilling
one of the conditions automatically leads to the ful-
fillment of the other. For a market in equilibrium, one
would expect this to be the case, but this question
remains to be answered.2
B. Market Instability
Changes in certificate prices cause some interesting
effects. The Swedish-Norwegian market operates with
a penalty calculated as 1.5 times the average certificate
price of the previous year. This leads to a short term
mathematical instability. An increase in price will lead to
an increase in the expected penalty, which subsequently
may cause the certificate prices to rise even further.
Given no intervention from market regulators, this
spiral could potentially lead to prices climbing infinitely
high or collapsing towards zero, depending on the
initial price movement.
Bio power could to some extent, benefit from higher
prices by increasing production. The percentage share
of such ”stabilizing renewables” in the mix of certificate
eligible electricity, will decide the magnitude of the
described instability. In the long run, the market will
be able to meet an increase in certificate prices with an
increased rate of investment in renewable electricity. This
will cause the supply of certificates to increase, which in
turns causes prices to decrease. The lead time of new
capacity will decide the duration of the time period
needed for the system to stabilize at a new equilibrium
level.
C. Alternatives to Price Feedback on Investments
Both for the discussion in the previous section and
for the example model in section III it is assumed that
the level of investments in new renewable capacity
is a positive function of the certificate price level.
This assumption is logical, as an increase in prices
will directly increase the gross profit of a renewable
plant. Two extreme cases are considered. In the
case of certificate prices moving towards infinity, all
investment opportunities will be taken. In the case
of prices collapsing towards zero, only investments
profitable without TGC support will be taken. However,
while prices fluctuate within an expected range, the
dependency between prices and investment rate is
considered uncertain and may vary for the different
technologies.
Historically, both dammed and run-of-river hydro
power have been profitable without subsidies. On
the other hand, the profitability of wind and bio
power have, with few exceptions, depended largely
on subsidies. Assuming that projects waiting to be
realized have similar characteristics, one can assess the
dependency between investment levels and certificate
2Thanks to Ove Wolfgang for posing this question.
3prices to be less prominent for hydro than for wind and
bio. Information from a key producer in the Norwegian
electricity market also indicates that their development
of new hydro power plants does not depend on prices,
but solely on access to capital. Wind and bio power
projects will depend on positive certificate prices to be
realized. Summing up, whether changes in certificate
prices affects investment decisions is unclear.
New renewable capacity must be in operation by
the end of 2020 to benefit fully from the TGC support
scheme. Considering the lead times of the different tech-
nologies, investment decisions must soon be made if the
new facilities are to be considered certificate eligible. An
interesting theory states that the power plants needed
to reach 26.4 TWh of new capacity before 2020 have
already been planned, since electricity producers have
a long planning horizon for future investments. If this is
the case, movements in certificate price will be of little
to no importance before 2020. Movements in certificate
price will thus only affect investments in Sweden after
2020, and prior to this, only expected electricity matter.
D. Expected Prices in the Market
As described in section II-A there are two alternative
ways to describe the price equilibrium in a TGC market.
However, the market price expected by market players
is not necessarily equal to the equilibrium price. Among
players, there might be a lack of information and
ability to model and forecast prices3. Thus actual price
expectations may not be consistent with theoretical
prices. For players in the certificate market, price
expectation may play a role both in investment
decisions and for trading purposes. Today there is a
futures market for certificates where contracts can be
traded up to five years ahead. The futures market is in
contango, with prices increasing with time to maturity.
Thus, price expectations seem to be in accordance
with the martingale condition4. Morthorst argues that
a liquid futures market for certificates might increase
long-term transparency in pricing while stabilizing
expectations [2].
III. EXAMPLE MODEL
This example model is an adaption of Coulon et al.’s
modeling of the New Jersey Solar Renewable Electricity
Certificate (SREC) market based on the equations
described in their paper [7]. The model was chosen due
to the promising results it has shown for the New Jersey
SREC market. Additonally, to the best of the authors’
knowledge, this is the first implementation of such an
3Some players in the market may utilize advanced forecasts for
future prices.
4The price in one time step is the discounted expected price at the
next time step.
approach for the Swedish-Norwegian market. 5
Minor adjustments to the equations have been made to
include the possibility of infinite banking of certificates.
Parameters have also been updated to reflect historical
values from the Swedish market during the period 2004-
2011.
A. Mathematical Formulation
bt =
(
max(0, bt 1 +
R t
t 1 gudu  Rt) t 2 N
b[t] 1 +
R t
t 1 gudu t /2 N
(1)
Eq. (1) keeps track of the accumulated number of
certificates, banking, in the market at any given time.
At any time step t, the currently banked balance bt is
a function of the previous balance b[t] 1 and the accu-
mulated issuance since the previous time step,
R t
t 1 gudu.
If the current time step is part of the set of compliance
dates N, (1) accounts for a reduction in the number of
certificates in the market, equal to the requirement Rt at
the given date. The balance can never be negative, hence
the max statement.
pt = max
v2{[t],[t]+1,...,T}
e r(v t)pvEt[1{bv=0}] (2a)
pt = e rDtE(pt+1) when t /2 N (2b)
At a compliance date, the holder of a certificate will
avoid the penalty imposed on those who do not comply
as he hands in his certificate. Further, if the balance of
certificates in the market directly following a compliance
date is 0, one can assume that investors would at least
have been willing to pay the amount of the penalty
fee for one certificate. Eq. (2a) states that at any time
t, the value of the certificate pt is the maximum of
the discounted expected future penalty fees it can be
used to avoid, discounted at the rate r. Eq. (2b), i.e. the
Martingale condition, follows implicitly from (2a) and
states that, except at compliance dates, the current price
is the discounted expected future price.
gt = gˆt(p) exp (a1 sin(4pt) + a2 cos(4pt)+
a3 sin(2pt) + a4 cos(2pt) + #t)
(3)
The seasonality of electricity consumption, and hence
certificate generation, is accounted for by a stochastic
process on the form shown in (3). gˆt represents the
annualized issuance of certificates and is a function
of price, p. This is motivated by the assumption that
investors are likely to invest more while certificate prices
are high. Seasonal changes are modeled by the sine and
5From 2003-2011, the electricity certificate market did only include
Sweden. Norway did not enter the market until 2012. Hence, the model
has been implemented for the Swedish market, to be able to replicate
historical price data.
4cosine functions, while a noise term is added to reflect
the uncertainty of generation.
ln(gˆt+Dt)  ln(gˆt)
Dt
= a5 + a6 p¯t, for a5 2 R, a6 > 0 (4)
Eq. (4) accounts for increase in generation. The price
feedback parameter a6 accounts for the logical effect that
producers are likely to invest more as prices rise. a5
represents the growth of generation not related to price
increases. It is an independent term describing the drift
in investments over time.
pt = p¯t (5)
Bellman introduced the term ”the curse of dimension-
ality”, referring to the exponentially increased execution
time associated with the introduction of another state
variable [8]. While Coulon’s generalized model uses a
weighted price average to calculate price feedback, it is
here assumed, as stated in eq. (5), that the current aver-
age price equals the spot price. This is done to reduce
dimensionality, and lower runtime. The result of this
adjustment is immediate price feedback on generation.
B. Implementation
It is assumed that the requirements and the penalties
are known and fixed for each year. The assumption
is done for the purpose of computational tractability.
Further work will investigate whether it is possible to
solve this price model within a reasonable timeframe,
without making this assumption.
The solution algorithm proceeds as follows:
1) A grid of values for bt and gˆt is chosen with lower
bounds zero and upper bounds a little above the
largest requirement. Time is discretized in monthly
steps, matching the frequency of historical genera-
tion data.
2) The dynamic program is initialized, evaluating the
payoff of the certificate at the end of the market’s
life t = T for every single gridpoint (bt, gˆt). At
this point, all information is known and hence, the
program yields a digital boundary price surface:
a) At grid points where there is a shortage of
certificates (i.e. the balance is less than the
requirement), investors are willing to pay the
penalty, pT = pT , for one certificate.
b) At grid points where there is a surplus of
certificates (i.e. the balance is higher than the
requirement), investors are willing to pay pT =
0 for one certificate.
3) From the boundary surface at t = T, the dynamic
program steps backward to t = (T   1). Here it
solves 1-5 at every grid point using price infor-
mation from the price surface at t = T. The same
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Fig. 1: Price Surface for t = 55 (July 2008), a6 = 15⇥ 10 4
procedure is then followed for every time step;
information from price surface t + 1 is being used
to solve 1-5 for every grid point of price surface t
with Matlab’s f solve function [9].
The algorithm provides one price surface for every
single time step. The price surfaces show what the price
would be at this time step, given a state (bt, gˆt). An
example of the resulting price surfaces is shown in figure
1. In order to compare the modeled prices to historical
data, one needs to extract the modeled price for the
historical levels of (bt and gˆt) for every time step. For the
given resolution level, the the runtime is approximately
2.5 hours on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU at 3.4
GHz.
C. Results and Interpretation
Comparing model output to historical prices, it is
seen that historical prices are replicated fairly well with
modeled and historical prices fluctuating around the
same trend line. While the modeled prices capture long
term trends quite well, fluctuations are not captured.
The model is requiring prices to equal discounted future
prices. These future prices are dependent on penalties
occurring once a year, thus short term fluctuations will
not be captured. This also follows from the frequency of
the input data which never exceeds monthly. Between
compliance dates, graphs are smooth and increasing due
to certificate prices satisfying the martingale condition
given by (2a) at all time steps. At compliance dates price
drops are sometimes observed. These drops stems from
foregone possibilities of using certificates for compliance.
The level of price feedback is determined by regression
parameter a6. A higher a6 reflects a greater degree of
flexibility among producers of electricity. Producers
respond more rapidly to price increases, investing in
more capacity to overcome a shortage of certificates
in the market. Prices are slightly lower for a greater
level of price feedback. Higher feedback levels dampens
fluctuations from the trend line.
As risk increases, so does the required rate of return.
The higher the required rate of return, the steeper
5the associated price curves. The sensitivity analysis
indicates that a required rate of return of 15% seems to
produce the best replication of historical prices. One can
argue that this is high. However, not only are investors
in the electricity certificate market exposed to price risk.
They are also exposed to regulatory risk [6]. This is the
risk that changes in regulations will materially impact
the certificate price. One reason why such changes
might occur is the mathematical instability of certificate
prices, mentioned in section II-B.
Further, it is observed that higher (lower) penalty
fees yield higher (lower) prices. This is as expected, as
the price of a certificate is a positive function of future
penalty fees.
Examining the results from the three sensitivity analy-
ses, it is found that the best replication of historical data
are produced using a discount rate = 15% with penalty
fees at historical levels. For parameter a6, the results are
inconclusive.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
The development over the markets first three years
indicates that the goal of an additional 26.4 TWh
of annual renewable capacity by 2020 is likely to be
reached. Due to differences in the tax regimes of Norway
and Sweden, some Swedish investment opportunities
with higher LCoE are likely to be taken before some of
their Norwegian counterparts with a lower LCoE, thus
increasing the total social costs of the system. Whether
the producers or the consumers are the ones carrying
the cost of the system is debatable, however, the system
is found to cause a reduction in the total social surplus.
From this it is assessed that the system achieves the
sought-after effects, but possibly at higher costs than
necessary.
The effects of price changes have several important
aspects. Due to the spiral dependence between previous
certificate prices and penalty fees, it is pointed out that
the system is mathematically unstable. However this
instability has yet to result in abnormal changes in the
certificate price. Further, the degree to which an increase
in prices is met by an increased rate of investments
in renewable capacity is unclear. However, from the
regression done on historical data, this effect is assessed
to exist.
The comparison of model output to historical
Swedish certificate prices shows that though short-term
fluctuations are not captured, long-term trends and
price levels are replicated quite well. This indicates that
the example model will be a suitable starting point for
further work.
From sensitivity analyses done for the penalty fee,
discount rate and the feedback effect, results are assessed
to be in accordance with the expected behavior. Prices
are observed to be positively dependent of the penalty
fee, the slope of the price curves increase with the
discount rate and an increased feedback effect dampens
price fluctuations. Furthermore, the penalty fee and
the discount rate seem to be the key drivers of the model.
Some important aspects of the market have yet to
be implemented. In contrast to the fixed penalty used
here, the penalties in the Swedish-Norwegian market
depend on prices observed over the previous year. To
include the penalty fee as an endogenous variable re-
quires the introduction of another state variable, leading
to a considerable increase in runtime. Generation of
electricity, and thus the issuance of certificates depend
on electricity prices and weather conditions. Including
electricity price forecasts and weather forecasts into the
model, allows for better estimates for the issuance of
certificates, consequently increasing the quality of the
certificate price forecasts. Further investigation in these
points will result in a more sophisticated price model for
the Swedish-Norwegian electricity market. This will be
a useful tool for both investors and regulators.
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A A NOTE ON LOWERING MODEL RUN TIME FOR STOCHASTIC
DYNAMIC PROGRAMS IN MATLAB
Appendices
A A note on lowering model run time for stochas-
tic dynamic programs in Matlab
The introduction of a new state variable into a model leads to an exponential
increase in model run time [18]. This was also true for the procedure presented
in this paper, when the state variable ⇡t was introduced. The model has how-
ever been kept computationally tractable by continuous improvement of the
algorithm, which has lead to a dramatically decreased model run time.
A.1 Parallel processing
Due to the recursive nature of the algorithm described in this paper, the price
cubes of every time step has to be calculated succeedingly. However, for a given
time step, solving the set of equations in grid points (bt, gˆt,⇡t) are independent
operations. This allows for parallel processing. The grid bt, gˆt is split into
vectors, one vector for each bt. Then for every point bt, gt of a given vector, the
equations are solved. Splitting the grid into vectors, allows Matlab to exploit
the power of multi-core processors. Iterating through the vectors with parfor
loops from the Matlab Parallel Computing Toolbox, makes Matlab solve as many
vectors as there are CPU-cores available, simultaneously. Solving the procedure
locally on a quadcore processor, this procedure lowered the run time by 75 %,
a substantial improvement. If one has access to a cluster, it is possible to scale
this up, lowering the run time even further with Matlab cloudfor loops.
Figure 1: Parallel processing of a grid
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A.2 Introduction of Fortran subroutines
While Matlab is an intuitive programming language, it does not o↵er the fastest
speed. It is an interpreted language, which means that most of its implementa-
tions execute instructions directly, without previous compiling of the program
into machine-language instructions. Therefore, compiled languages like C, C++
and FORTRAN often o↵er substantial increases of speed. The NAG Toolbox for
Matlab, is a set of subroutines written in FORTRAN. It o↵ers FORTRAN imple-
mentations of many native Matlab functions. Swapping the native fixed point
iteration procedure of Matlab, fsolve, with its FORTRAN subroutine counter-
part, nag roots withdraw sys func easy (c05nb), more than doubled the speed of
the electricity certificate model. The c05nb function finds a solution of a system
of nonlinear equations by a modification of the Powell hybrid method [19].
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B EXTRACTING SMOOTH FORWARD CURVES FROM
AVERAGE-BASED ELECTRICITY CONTRACTS
B Extracting Smooth Forward Curves From Average-
Based Electricity Contracts
As storage of electricity is extremely costly, electricity futures are traded on a
constant delivery flow over the settlement period. Such contracts are classified
as average-based forward contracts and are settled against the average spot
price. In the Nordic market, such contracts are traded with di↵erent settlement
periods. These settlement periods are often overlapping, which implies that for
a given future date, several prices are observed in the market. For the contract
with a yearly settlement period, one would pay the average yearly spot price,
while for the contract with a monthly settlement period, one would pay the
average spot price for that given month.
Figure 2: Monthly and Quarterly Contracts
Benth et al. proposes the following model for extracting smooth forward
curves from these contracts. The method takes the observed contracts and uses
a Lagrangian method to create smooth forward curves, fitting the contracts to a
seasonality function under a maximum smoothness criteria. For any given time
to expiry, the resulting forward curves can be interpreted as the future price for
a contract with daily settlement.
The forward price f(t) is decomposed into
f(t) = s(t) + "(t), t 2 [t0, tn]
where s(t) represents a seasonality function and "(t) represents an adjustment
function that measures the forward curve’s deviation from seasonality.
For s(t) an estimate of the seasonality in the Nord Pool market, calibrated by
Lucia and Schwartz [20] has been used.
s(t) = 145.732 + 29.735⇥ cos
✓
(t+ 6.91)
2⇡
365
◆
(1)
The set of start and end dates of m contracts on the form F (TS , TE) is denoted
  = {(TS1 , TE1 ), (TS2 , TE2 ), ..., (TSm, TEm)}
A new set of dates is constructed. Sorting the starting dates TS and ending
dates TE in ascending order and removing duplicates yields a set on the form
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{(t1, t2, ..., tn)}.
The adjustment function " is implemented as a spline function on the form
"(t) =
8>>><>>>:
a1t4 +b1t3 +c1t2 +d1t +e1 t 2 [t0, t1]
a2t4 +b2t3 +c2t2 +d2t +e2 t 2 [t1, t2]
...
ant4 +bnt3 +cnt2 +dnt +en t 2 [tn 1, tn]
9>>>=>>>;
To find the parameters
xT = [a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 a2 b2 c2 d2 e2, . . . , an bn cn dn en]
of "(t) the equality constrained convex quadratic programming problem
min
x
Z tn
t0
["00(t;x)]2dt (2)
is solved subject to constraints in the connectivity and smoothness of derivatives
at the knots, j = 1, . . . , n  1,
(aj+1 aj)t4j +(bj+1 bj)t3j +(cj+1 cj)t2j +(dj+1 dj)tj+(ej+1 ej) = 0 (3)
4(aj+1   aj)t3j + 3(bj+1   bj)t2j + 2(cj+1   cj)tj + (dj+1   dj) = 0 (4)
12(aj+1   aj)t2j + 6(bj+1   bj)tj + 2(cj+1   cj) = 0 (5)
"0(tn;x) = 0 (6)
FCi =
Z T si
T ei
w(r; t)("(t) + s(t))dt (7)
where
w(r; ti) =
e r⌧k
⌃Nj=1e
 rtj
Equations (2)-(7) is rewritten and solved with the method of Lagrange multi-
pliers to obtain

x⇤
 ⇤
 
.
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C Predicting a long term factor for the electric-
ity price as expected by investors
The logarithm of the electricity spot price is denoted by Xt. It is further de-
composed into two factors.
Xt =  t + ⇠t (8)
 t represents the short-term deviation and ⇠t represents the long-term equi-
librium level. The short-term deviations are assumed to follow an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process.
d t =   tdt+   dz , (9)
The equilibrium level is assumed to follow a Brownian motion process.
d⇠t = µ⇠dt+  ⇠dz⇠. (10)
 t and ⇠t can be found to be jointly normally distributed with mean and
covariance:
E[( t, ⇠t)] = [e t 0, ⇠0 + µt⇠] (11a)
Cov[( t, ⇠t)] =
24 (1  e 2t) 2 2 (1  e t)⇢ ⇠   ⇠
(1  e t)⇢ ⇠   ⇠  2⇠ t
35 (11b)
Thus, the logarithm of the spot price is normally distributed with:
E[Xt] = e t 0 + ⇠0 + µ⇠t (12a)
Var[Xt] = (1  e 2t)
 2 
2
+  2⇠ t+ 2(1  e t)
⇢ ⇠   ⇠

(12b)
Further, the expected spot is then log-normally distributed, and can be found
from:
ln(E[St]) = E[Xt] +
1
2
V ar[Xt]
= e t 0 + ⇠0 + µ⇠t+
1
2
 
(1  e 2t) 
2
 
2
+  2⇠ t+ 2(1  e t)
⇢ ⇠   ⇠

!
(13)
Thus, an forecast of future spot prices can be calculated given the state vari-
ables  t and ⇠t, and the required parameters.
A standard Kalman filter was applied for the calculation of the state variables,
  and ⇠, and the required parameters for the electricity forecast, ,   ,  ⇠,
⇢ ⇠ and µ⇠. The evolution of the state variables is described by the following
transition equation.
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xt = c+Qxt 1 + ⌘t, t = 1, . . . , nT (14)
where:
xt = [ t, ⇠t], a 2⇥1 vector of state variables
c = [0, µ⇠ t], a 2⇥1 vector
Q = [ t, ⇠t], a 2⇥2 matrix
⌘t is a 2⇥1 vector of serially uncorrelated normally distributed disturbances
with E[⌘t] = 0 and
Var[⌘t] =
24 (1  e 2 t) 2 2 (1  e  t)⇢ ⇠   ⇠
(1  e  t)⇢ ⇠   ⇠  2⇠ t
35
Based on these equations the Kalman filter is run recursively. In each time-step
the observed forward prices and the previous time-step’s esitmates of the state
variables to calculate new estimates for the state variables. Further a correction
is made in every time-step based on the di↵erence between the actual observed
prices and the prices following from the estimates variables. The estimation is
done for an assumed set of parameters. The likelihood of the observations can
be calculated for a given set of parameters. The Kalman filter can then be re-
run, varying set of parameters to identify the set that maximizes the likelihood
function. Finally, a solution for the state variables and the set of parameters is
obtained.
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D Regression Error Term Characteristics
Figure 3: Characteristics of the coe cient regression error terms
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